Home › Discussions › Letters to the Editor › GOING NUCLEAR-FREE

GOING NUCLEAR-FREE

By Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky
March/April 2001
Print Email
Login or Register to leave a comment.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.
Essay
The Folly of Arms Control
Jonathan Schell

Ten years after the end of the Cold War, nuclear danger is rising. Despite the end of the struggle in whose name the great nuclear arsenals were built, Washington now seeks to stop proliferation while holding on to its own arsenal indefinitely. But as nuclear restrictions falter -- battered by India's and Pakistan's tests, Iraq's defiance, North Korea's missiles, and the U.S. missile-defense plan -- the absence of a middle ground becomes stark. Holding on to nuclear arms is not a deterrent but a "proliferant" that goads others to join the club. Arms control has become a way of avoiding a fateful choice: a world of uncontrolled proliferation or a world with no nuclear weapons at all.

To the Editor:

Although Jonathan Schell's article eloquently describes the current nuclear weapons predicament, it does not justify its title, "The Folly of Arms Control" (September/October 2000). Schell's proposed remedy for the stagnation in the arms control process is a commitment made by the nuclear powers, led by the United States, to abolish nuclear weapons. But as a signatory to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States has already accepted this commitment. What would a reaffirmation of it accomplish without concrete steps in arms control?

A series of progressive restraints must be implemented to counteract the NPT'S discriminatory designation of nuclear and non-nuclear states. Indeed, as Schell emphasizes, the U.S. retention of an "enduring stockpile" of some 10,000 nuclear weapons is fundamentally inconsistent with the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, Russia's recent proclamation of increased reliance on nuclear weapons contravenes the goal of nonproliferation. If the strongest nations still need large and "enduring" inventories of nuclear weapons, don't other nations need nuclear weapons even more?

In view of all this, the "folly" of arms control must be pursued to decrease the numbers of all nuclear weapons, not only strategic weapons. U.S. leadership is essential. Nuclear states must continue to improve the surety of command-and-control systems and remove the hair-trigger status of nuclear weapons. The disposal of nuclear-weapons materials must be drastically accelerated.

We must distinguish between the "abolition" of nuclear weapons and their "prohibition." In its strict sense, abolition appears impossible: nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented. But prohibition would be feasible if a broad international consensus could be built to attain it. Moreover, alternate routes toward prohibition must be considered. Should the nuclear weapons-free zones be augmented such that eventually they cover the entire globe? Should the NPT be amended to abolish the category of "nuclear" states? Should the nuclear states convene to generate a timetable under which they would meet their obligations to the NPT? Should prohibition of nuclear weapons be placed on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva? Should a broad-based conference be called to discuss the worldwide prohibition of nuclear weapons?

Each of these routes faces profound obstacles but also extends hope for progress. It is unfortunate that Schell's article only advocates reaffirming the commitment to nonproliferation but does not attempt to chart a road map for the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

WOLFGANG K.H. PANOFSKY

Professor and Director Emeritus, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University

Related

Essay, Winter 1985
What Went Wrong With Arms Control?
Thomas C. Shelling

Arms control has certainly gone off the tracks. For several years what are called arms negotiations have been mostly a public exchange of accusations; and it often looks as if it is the arms negotiations that are driving the arms race. It is hard to escape the impression that the planned procurement of 50 MX missiles (at latest count) has been an obligation imposed by a doctrine that the end justifies the means--the end something called arms control, and the means a demonstration that the United States does not lack the determination to match or exceed the Soviets in every category of weapons.

Read
Essay, Summer 1984
Nuclear Arms Control: Where Do We Stand?
Harold Brown and Lynn E. Davis

Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control are at an impasse. Following the deployment in Europe of the first U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in the fall of 1983, the Soviet Union walked out of the negotiations on intermediate-range forces (INF) and refused to agree to a resumption date for the negotiations on strategic nuclear forces (START). Whether and under what conditions the negotiations will resume is uncertain.

Read
Essay, Special 1983
Buildup and Breakdown
Strobe Talbott

For the Reagan Administration, 1983 was to be "the year of the missile." It was to be the moment of truth in the American effort to introduce new intermediate-range weapons into Western Europe and to "modernize" the U.S. strategic arsenal, primarily with the development of the MX intercontinental missile. Until this buildup in defenses was well under way, nuclear arms control would be a matter of keeping up appearances, of limiting damage, of buying time, and of laying the ground for possible agreement later.

Read