Our Vietnam: The War, 1954-1975
Langguth covered Vietnam for The New York Times in 1964-65, visiting again for special stories in 1968 and 1970. He never lost interest but he did gain ambition, and with this book he attempts a one-volume history that is truly international, including the perspectives of Americans and Vietnamese, both North and South. The author finds that the North Vietnamese fought bravely and capably for national independence and a bad system, whereas the South Vietnamese fought for a good cause that was "betrayed by ineptitude and greed." Langguth avoids making strong interpretive arguments, opting instead for "a straightforward narrative that would let readers draw their own conclusions." That useful goal is attained. Lacking much analytical structure, the narrative can seem like a string of episodes, just one after another. But the episodes touch on so many impassioned memories that Langguth does well to hold on to a reasonably balanced perspective. A tougher problem is that his ecumenical method cannot compensate where his sources are weak or misleading, such as those from behind the scenes among the North Vietnamese, the Soviets, and the Chinese.
Related
Eighteen months after its enunciation at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure and contradictory in its intent and application. It is not simply that the wider pattern of war in Indochina challenges the Doctrine's promise of a lower posture in Asia. More than that, close analysis and the unfolding of events expose some basic flaws in the logic of the Administration's evolving security policy for the new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly includes more than the declaratory policy orientation. It comprises also the revised worldwide security strategy of "1½ wars" and the new defense decision-making processes such as "fiscal guidance budgeting." These elements have received little comment, especially in their integral relation to our commitments in Asia. But the effects of this Administration's moves in these areas will shape and constrain the choices of the United States for a long time to come.
Let us make two assumptions: first, that the Viet Nam war has reached the beginning of the end and that it will be over within the next year or two; second, that the settlement will involve an American defeat and the extension of communist power to South Viet Nam. Events may falsify both these assumptions, but they may not; it is worth thinking about what the situation will be like if they do not.
The Clinton administration inherits strained bilateral relations with the leading powers of Asia and no coherent policy for the Asia / Pacific region as a whole. Trade, security and diplomatic style are the overarching challenges and on all three counts prominent Asians are worried. They fear a president bent on building trade walls, bringing home American troops and lecturing on human rights. Yet respect for the United States remains instinctive throughout the region, particularly given convincing progress in rejuvenating the American economy. Asia's quest for economic growth and more democratic government awaits leadership from Washington.

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