Two Strategies for Europe: De Gaulle, the U.S., and the Atlantic Alliance
Bozo, a top French scholar of foreign policy and strategic affairs, has written a masterful account of the intricate issues that have plagued Franco-American relations for so long. He focuses on the second "reign" of President Charles de Gaulle (1958-69, when Franco-American tensions were at their worst) to dissect de Gaulle's priorities as well as his methods. The primacy of political independence, the push for autonomy within NATO, and the determination to provide France with a nuclear deterrent under exclusive French control were goals de Gaulle never abandoned. Yet considerable pragmatism in tactics and strategic designs accompanied his inflexibility in purpose. Bozo's assessment of de Gaulle's legacy also stands out. Beyond independence for France, the general sought diplomatic and strategic autonomy for Europe, which meant a drastic reform of NATO that required broad support from France's European partners. He had not succeeded at the time he left office, but French policy has exhibited strong continuities ever since -- as has America's desire to remain strategically preeminent in Europe. As Bozo puts it, "the French 'difference' has become less systematic" than under de Gaulle, but "European goals do remain and they are on the agenda more than ever" -- as the embryonic European foreign and security policy demonstrates.
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Reviews the record of recent French diplomacy including support for NATO in the early 1980s, Chad, Lebanon, and the 'Rainbow Warrior' affair. "Yet France cannot remain prisoner of her great past and of the myths created by de Gaulle". Her future lies within a European framework, within which the issues of her nuclear deterrent, her lack of adequate conventional military strength, and her declining economic competitiveness must all be addressed. Summarized in D Moïsi 'A threatened France must retreat to Europe' IHT 9 Sep 1988 p4.
Nato's "disarray" has been made into a crisis by President de Gaulle's decision to withdraw French forces and facilities from the integrated structure of the Alliance. For the other NATO powers, and for the United States, this has provided a shock, but-in some ways-a salutary one. The fundamental issues of Europe's future, of Soviet-Western relations and of American policy are now more likely to be addressed. Before the French action these issues would likely have been evaded. Now there still is time to think relatively slowly and carefully about the objectives of the European-American alliance and of the United States itself in Europe's affairs.
How can the United States and Europe mend the Western alliance after the split over Iraq? Some Europeans now favor engaging America head on, by building an independent military. But the best answer lies in complementarity, not competition. The two sides should focus on common goals, with each doing what it does best.

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