The recent trial of two Libyans for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, raises a vexing problem for U.S. policymakers: What should Washington do when American containment policy starts to pay off and a "rogue" state starts to reform? After years of international isolation, Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafi is ending his belligerence and starting to meet many of the demands placed on him by Washington and its allies. Now President Bush must figure out how to keep the pressure on while recognizing Libya's progress and helping reintegrate it into the world community.
Ray Takeyh is a Soref Research Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Takeyh's postscript to his May/June 2001 essay "The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold."
LIBYA MENDS ITS WAYS
As the Bush administration struggles to define its foreign policy, with sanctions slipping on Iraq and the prospect of missile defense raising complications around the world, a new question has emerged: How should Washington handle a "rogue" state that is gradually abandoning its objectionable practices? What should the United States do when its long-standing policy toward a maverick country such as Libya starts to pay off -- and that country finally begins to clean up its act? The question has recently become a pressing one as, in a surprising twist of events, the often and justifiably maligned Libyan regime of Colonel Mu'ammar Qaddafi has started to meet international demands and redress its past crimes. How the United States responds will serve as a test of Washington's ability to reintegrate a reforming "rogue" into the community of nations.
On January 31, three Scottish judges deliberating at a specially convened court in the Netherlands convicted a Libyan intelligence agent for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103. The attack, which occurred over Lockerbie, Scotland, killed 270 passengers (including 189 Americans) and passersby, dramatizing the threat that terrorism and its state sponsors pose to the United States. The recent verdict has achieved a modicum of justice. But it has only reconfirmed, rather than resolved, the quandary that Libya's behavior raises for U.S. foreign policy. On the one hand, the verdict seems to have validated long-held perceptions of Libya as a pariah state. But on the other hand, the very fact that Qaddafi surrendered the suspects suggests that international pressure has prompted subtle yet significant changes in his foreign policy. After decades of militancy, Libya seems to be accommodating itself to international norms.
Few have acknowledged the true dimensions of the challenge these changes pose for Washington. President George W. Bush must deal with the remaining Lockerbie-related issues -- including how to force Tripoli to accept responsibility for the crime -- while also figuring out how to move beyond them. Successive American administrations have proven adept at devising strategies for isolating offending regimes such as Libya's. But Washington has thus far neglected to plan what to do when it succeeds.
RADICAL SHEIK
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US policy towards Libya has confused the aim of stopping Libyan-inspired terrorism with that of overthrowing Gaddafi, and is based on a false picture of the domestic situation in Libya. Describes the economic status of Libya and its political organization. The regime should be left to its own 'self-destruction'.
Charts the origins, contents and achievements of Reagan's most popular and successful policy, anti-terrorism, and how Irangate dented it. The controversial bombing of Libya was popular at home and moved allies to take effective anti-terrorist action. The importance of the media in his policy was emphasized by the scandal. Moderating Iran was a major objective, especially with hostages still being held in the Middle East and given its strategic importance. The dilemma for democratic governments (that they must oppose the criminality of terrorists, but also have humanitarian obligations to their citizens held hostage by terrorists) led the Reagan administration into the arms-for-hostages bid. Notes French, Greek and Italian collusion with terrorism and hopes that the affair will not unduly hamper the US administration in foreign policy generally.
The Bush administration contends that the push for democracy in the Muslim world will improve U.S. security. But this premise is faulty: there is no evidence that democracy reduces terrorism. Indeed, a democratic Middle East would probably result in Islamist governments unwilling to cooperate with Washington.

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