The Unanswered Question: Attempting to Explain the Rwandan Genocide
Seven years after more than 500,000 Tutsi were massacred in Rwanda, the world still cannot explain why. Mahmood Mamdani's When Victims Become Killers is a rich history of Hutu and Tutsi identity, but how it applies to the genocide is unclear.
Jeffrey Herbst is Chair of the Department of Politics at Princeton University and the author most recently of States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.
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In addition to these strengths, however, Mamdani's book has one minor and one major flaw. The lesser problem is the author's occasional willingness to criticize faceless intellectual adversaries with whom he wants to pick a fight. One target is the "area studies" school, which he faults for paying paramount attention to geography, with the result that "we have experts on Rwanda, and others on Uganda, but not on both." The practitioners of area studies, found only in the West, are also accused of being "profoundly antitheoretical." No particular person is cited in these attacks on whole schools of scholarship, perhaps because the criticisms are demonstrably false. Indeed, Mamdani's own work depends heavily on books and articles by Western scholars of Africa, who recognize regional dynamics and who have tried hard to put years of fieldwork into coherent intellectual frameworks. Invariably, Mamdani treats the work of individual area scholars with respect and deftness. That Mamdani has chosen to fabricate a collective, faceless, "Western" enemy, while at the same time writing about how political identities can lead to violence and disaster, is a profound and somewhat sad irony.
The book's major flaw is that it does not persuasively link its elaborate historical and theoretical argument to the genocide itself. Mamdani does not actually get to the genocide until page 218 of his 282 pages of text, and then devotes a paltry 15 pages to how it was carried out. This crucial section presents simply a series of anecdotes, without even an attempt to suggest that they are intended to portray the complex implementation of the genocide. Most of the stories, moreover, give the perspective of the Tutsi victims -- when for Mamdani's theory to be persuasive, it would have to be linked to the actions and motivations of the Hutu killers. To be fair, telling their stories would have been difficult because many of the Hutu killers fled to eastern Zaire (as it was then known) to continue their struggle against the Tutsi from exile.
Mamdani writes defensively that he is interested not in narrating atrocity stories "ad infinitum" but rather in understanding the political nature of the crimes in historical context. Still, the imbalance between the book's elaborate theoretical and historical apparatus and its empirical evidence is a central problem. Mamdani does not even take full advantage of the analysis of the local politics of the genocide produced by Human Rights Watch in its excellent study, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. Without a much more thorough linkage between theory and fact, the book's central historical and theoretical propositions must be viewed as unproven. The mere existence of even extremely antagonistic racial divisions does not explain why so many individual citizens appear to have participated so enthusiastically in the genocide, especially given the long history of coexistence and intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi. Indeed, the variation in local responses by Hutu once the killings began -- which Mamdani fully acknowledges -- suggests that factors other than the drama of national identity may have been at work, including differing local histories of Hutu-Tutsi relations, the nature of the link between central political leaders and localities, and the decisions made by prominent local individuals. Mamdani's failure to draw in more evidence in support of his arguments means that despite the sophistication of his theoretical work, there is simply no way of knowing how much he has contributed to the understanding of the genocide.
What Mamdani has done successfully is to pose in stark terms how difficult it is to explain a genocide. The rich, complex history of identity formation that he develops makes other interpretations -- including the notion that ecological pressure in the densely settled country somehow led to the genocide, or that individual Hutu were simply following orders -- seem too mechanical. Rather than settling the argument, however, Mamdani's explanation should serve as a useful invitation for further empirical studies that systematically explore how different local Rwandan communities responded to calls for genocide and then link those particular local actions to overarching explanations.
AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
The central issue for the future of the Great Lakes region is how the security of the Tutsi will be assured. From the Tutsi perspective, the genocide's lesson is that as a vulnerable minority in the population, they must monopolize political power in order to survive. But the permanent exclusion of the majority Hutu from political authority hardly seems likely or workable. Mamdani wrestles with this question and produces some suggestive hints regarding the complexity of Hutu and Tutsi identity. Especially salient is his appreciation of the need to distinguish among the Hutu -- in particular, between those who had been involved in the genocide but who may now want to reach an accommodation with the Tutsi, and those who continue to be obsessed with Hutu solidarity. This seems at least vaguely plausible, as it will probably be impossible to find a significant number of Hutu without blood on their hands to participate in a political settlement. The problem, however, is that even after the genocide, precious few Hutu have stepped forward to join in a political solution, and it is not clear how much of the Hutu population they represent.
It is hardly a criticism of Mamdani that he does not provide a "solution" to Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. No one else, including the Rwandans, has come up with anything that looks even remotely viable. But Mamdani does do a good job highlighting the obstacles to any long-term settlement. Their identification is one important step toward a stable peace for this troubled region.
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