President Nixon: Alone in the White House
In his presidential biography of John F. Kennedy, Reeves developed a distinctive narrative style. He picked representative days to show how issues converged in the Oval Office and how the president connected and handled them. In such a vivid frame, work and personal habits became clear. Reeves now applies the same successful approach to Richard Nixon. His research is solid, using some good new sources. Reeves' narrative structure also works well for a president who tried so hard to pull every string from behind his desk. Holding the reader in that office, always seeing the world through the lens of a withdrawn, insecure president, Reeves depicts an atmosphere of constant manipulation and deception. Reeves is neutral in his handling of most of the policy issues. But in the strange world he re-creates, all the successes seem hollow. Only the growing number of perceived enemies seems truly real.
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Author's Note: This article summarizes a section by S. M. Lipset in "They Would Rather Be Left," by S. M. Lipset and Gerald Schaflander, to be published next fall by Little, Brown.
Since September of 1970 a renewal of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has been in prospect Highly placed White House sources reported that the Soviet Union had begun work on a submarine base on the southern coast of Cuba at Cienfuegos, a base which could repair and refuel missile-firing submarines of the Soviet Navy. Warnings were issued that this would be viewed with the "utmost seriousness" by the United States as a violation of the 1962 agreement by which land-based missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. Cited explicitly were President Kennedy's words that peace would be assured only "if all offensive missiles are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future."
Our reactions to Soviet foreign policy have a way of jumping from one extreme to another, both in the long and short run, with more regard for changing superficial appearances than permanent objective factors. During the last year of the Second World War, we tended to idealize the Russians, Stalin became "Uncle Joe" to be charmed by Roosevelt into coöperation, and the United Nations, having done away with "power politics," was supposed to be the vehicle of that coöperation. From 1947 onwards, the Kremlin was perceived as the headquarters of the devil on earth, causing all that was wrong with the world and, more particularly, scheming the destruction of the United States. These extreme swings of the pendulum can also be observed in much shorter time spans.
