No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam
Berman is not neutral about Nixon's policies. On the transcendent issue of Vietnam, Berman finds there was no attempted "peace with honor" for Congress to betray by refusing to aid South Vietnam. Even those scholars who say that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger just wanted a "decent interval" between withdrawal and South Vietnamese collapse are being too kind, Berman argues. A respected historian using newly available Vietnamese and American sources, Berman writes that Nixon and Kissinger never expected peace. In fact, they were prepared to violate the accords they negotiated, and they planned for an indefinite limited war and American military commitment in Vietnam. The peace accords would be the excuse to persuade others to support such a policy. But Berman's evidence does not sustain such a neat indictment. Instead, this grim story seems more a portrait of policymakers who kept hoping for peace with honor but kept settling for something less -- ever struggling to rationalize away the gap between the image of themselves as powerful statesmen and the real mastery of events by Moscow and Hanoi. The communist leaders knew just who was manipulating whom.
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During Richard Nixon's first term, when I served as secretary of defense, we withdrew most U.S. forces from Vietnam while building up the South's ability to defend itself. The result was a success -- until Congress snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by cutting off funding for our ally in 1975. Washington should follow a similar strategy now, but this time finish the job properly.
NOT since World War II have Americans been so uncertain about the proper role of the United States in the world. The broad bipartisan consensus that characterized American foreign policy for two decades after the war has been overcome by widespread, bipartisan confusion about the nature of the world, the character of the challenges that policymakers confront, and the proper employment of non-nuclear forces. Viet Nam is not the only cause of this confusion. Changes In American perceptions were evident earlier: as the fear of monolithic communism waned, hope grew that the United States and the Soviet Union could coexist peacefully; and the public showed diminishing interest in providing aid to less developed countries. But the expenditure of blood and treasure in Viet Nam has deepened fundamental doubts throughout our society-from the highest levels of government to college campuses and midwestern farms-as to whether the United States should in any circumstances become involved again in a limited war. A Time- Louis Harris Poll in May indicated that only a minority of Americans are willing to see United States troops used to resist overt communist aggression against our allies: in Berlin, 26 percent; in Thailand, 25 percent; and in Japan, 27 percent.
Since September of 1970 a renewal of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis has been in prospect Highly placed White House sources reported that the Soviet Union had begun work on a submarine base on the southern coast of Cuba at Cienfuegos, a base which could repair and refuel missile-firing submarines of the Soviet Navy. Warnings were issued that this would be viewed with the "utmost seriousness" by the United States as a violation of the 1962 agreement by which land-based missiles were withdrawn from Cuba. Cited explicitly were President Kennedy's words that peace would be assured only "if all offensive missiles are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future."

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