Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century
In this passionate call for a new world order, McNamara and Blight write that the twentieth century ended without a solution to the wars and communal violence that made it the bloodiest century in history. Inspired by Woodrow Wilson's idealism and vision of collective security -- but also sensitive to his missteps -- the authors propose a controversial agenda of nuclear disarmament, multilateral security cooperation, and integration of non-Western great powers into a stable and morally legitimate order. In their view, the return to realpolitik diplomacy is dangerous and incompatible with a tightly wired global economy. China and Russia must be integrated with the Western powers as fully as Germany and France were reconciled and bound together after 1945. In confronting ethnic violence and failed states, the United States should demonstrate "realistic empathy," foreswear unilateral intervention, rely on collective leadership of alliance partners, and support a United Nations capable of deploying its own volunteer police force. Rather than build a missile defense, Washington should gradually phase out nuclear weapons. It is surprising that the authors do not explore how the global democratic revolution has altered geopolitics and the opportunities for new security thinking. But their book is sure to provoke debate.
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It is a delicate matter to defend deterrence, the doctrine that it is the very lethality of nuclear weapons that lessens the likelihood of their use sufficiently to make us safe. That the consciousness of that lethality in the corridors of power in Washington and Moscow has played an important role in the keeping of the peace since the advent of the nuclear age is beyond doubting, as is the unwisdom of tampering with that consciousness, of accepting theories or technologies that will diminish the terror with which the prospect of nuclear war has been traditionally regarded and make nuclear weapons in any way less inhibiting to use. Still, if it is possible to underestimate the contribution that nuclear weapons make to the prevention of nuclear war, it is possible to overestimate it, too.
The reelection of Ronald Reagan makes the future of his Strategic Defense Initiative the most important question of nuclear arms competition and arms control on the national agenda since 1972. The President is strongly committed to this program, and senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, have made it clear that he plans to intensify this effort in his second term. Sharing the gravest reservations about this undertaking, and believing that unless it is radically constrained during the next four years it will bring vast new costs and dangers to our country and to mankind, we think it urgent to offer an assessment of the nature and hazards of this initiative, to call for the closest vigilance by Congress and the public, and even to invite the victorious President to reconsider. While we write only after obtaining the best technical advice we could find, our central concerns are political. We believe the President_s initiative to be a classic case of good intentions that will have bad results because they do not respect reality.
Of all the emotions arising from strategic arms control today, the most profound is disappointment. In this, as in little else in the vast realm of arms control, conservatives and liberals concur--conservatives for the failure of arms control to diminish the ever more ominous Soviet strategic buildup, liberals for its failure to diminish the ever more wasteful strategic "arms race."
