Rethinking the Holocaust
An ambitious attempt to answer some of the most important questions raised by the Holocaust. For Bauer, the Holocaust was neither inhuman nor unfathomable but nonetheless was pure evil. Its uniqueness lay in its ideological motivation, whereas other genocides had "pragmatic considerations" as their causes. He points to the nineteenth-century spread of antisemitism among Germany's intellectual classes for the origins of the Holocaust, but he primarily blames an "elite of the Nazi Party" with murderous antisemitic inclinations. Although this elite came to power for reasons unrelated to its genocidal program, it could carry out its plans once it drew the intellectual stratum to its side. Bauer reviews other Holocaust theories -- including those of Daniel Goldhagen (whose approach he mostly rejects) and Saul Friedlander (to whom he is closer) -- and examines such issues as Jewish resistance and the general absence of rescue attempts. He argues that information about the Holocaust did exist and kept snowballing during the war; the problem was that it was not given credence. On Israel's creation, Bauer concludes that the United Kingdom's refusal to let 100,000 Holocaust survivors into Palestine was the deciding factor in swinging U.S. policy to support the Jewish state, even though "there were almost not enough Jews left to fight for a state." Whether one agrees with all his points, this is a thoughtful and sensible book.
Related
The history of the Atlantic Alliance is a history of crises. But we must distinguish between the routine difficulties engendered by Western Europe's dependence on the United States for its security, as well as by the economic interdependence of the allies, and major breakdowns or misunderstandings which reveal not simply an inevitable divergence of interests but dramatically different views of the world and priorities. At the present time, complaints from West European leaders about the effects of high American interest rates on their economies, or about President Reagan's skeptical approach to North-South economic issues, belong in the first category. The current controversy in Europe over nuclear weapons belongs in the second, and now confronts the Alliance with one of its most dangerous tests.
Since nuclear deterrence began, some of the forces providing deterrence for the West have been stationed in Europe. In the early period, when delivery systems did not yet enjoy intercontinental range, European real estate was essential for America's strategic deterrent. But with new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-based nuclear missiles, introduced in the late 1950s, the U.S. nuclear deterrent no longer required bases in Europe: the age of geographic deterrence identity between the United States and its European allies had come to an end.
Since the end of World War II, Europe and North America have enjoyed an unprecedented era of peace. The central framework for maintaining that peace has been the North Atlantic Alliance and its permanent organization, NATO. Created to secure the West against aggression through a mutual defense system, NATO has proved remarkably successful in meeting a variety of challenges over the years. It has done so because Western leaders and the overwhelming majority of their countrymen have recognized the virtues of collective security for nations whose fundamental interests are held so closely in common.
