Rethinking the Holocaust
An ambitious attempt to answer some of the most important questions raised by the Holocaust. For Bauer, the Holocaust was neither inhuman nor unfathomable but nonetheless was pure evil. Its uniqueness lay in its ideological motivation, whereas other genocides had "pragmatic considerations" as their causes. He points to the nineteenth-century spread of antisemitism among Germany's intellectual classes for the origins of the Holocaust, but he primarily blames an "elite of the Nazi Party" with murderous antisemitic inclinations. Although this elite came to power for reasons unrelated to its genocidal program, it could carry out its plans once it drew the intellectual stratum to its side. Bauer reviews other Holocaust theories -- including those of Daniel Goldhagen (whose approach he mostly rejects) and Saul Friedlander (to whom he is closer) -- and examines such issues as Jewish resistance and the general absence of rescue attempts. He argues that information about the Holocaust did exist and kept snowballing during the war; the problem was that it was not given credence. On Israel's creation, Bauer concludes that the United Kingdom's refusal to let 100,000 Holocaust survivors into Palestine was the deciding factor in swinging U.S. policy to support the Jewish state, even though "there were almost not enough Jews left to fight for a state." Whether one agrees with all his points, this is a thoughtful and sensible book.
Related
The history of the Atlantic Alliance is a history of crises. But we must distinguish between the routine difficulties engendered by Western Europe's dependence on the United States for its security, as well as by the economic interdependence of the allies, and major breakdowns or misunderstandings which reveal not simply an inevitable divergence of interests but dramatically different views of the world and priorities. At the present time, complaints from West European leaders about the effects of high American interest rates on their economies, or about President Reagan's skeptical approach to North-South economic issues, belong in the first category. The current controversy in Europe over nuclear weapons belongs in the second, and now confronts the Alliance with one of its most dangerous tests.
In many areas, transatlantic cooperation is stronger than ever before. Yet the common perception is of an increasingly fraught relationship, as evidenced by the well-known disputes over beef, bananas, and burden sharing. Assumptions are diverging over security risks and cultural values. Each side criticizes the other's unwieldy policymaking process without admitting its own shortcomings, while leaders pander to domestic interests and prejudices without educating voters on international issues. Europe nonetheless remains indispensable to a multilateral U.S. foreign policy. The Bush administration must acknowledge the European Union as a true partner, in political and military matters as well as in economics. America cannot expect its allies to share the burdens of global leadership without allowing them their say in the issues at stake.
It was the third week in August 1968 and the North Atlantic allies were relaxing on their beaches, in their mountains and in their chancelleries too. There was plenty to relax about, for 1968 had started as a big year for détente in Europe. The East-West exchange in political leaders was at an all-time high; a Western leader who had not recently been in Poland or Rumania was hardly alive politically unless he was home preparing to receive his opposite number from Hungary or Bulgaria. The Mayor of Moscow was in The Hague; the Red Army Choir was about to entertain in the concert halls of England; the University of Minnesota Band was practicing for its trip to the Soviet Union. The John F. Kennedy Airport was braced for the second ceremonial Aeroflot flight, part of the new nonstop service between Moscow and New York. In Moscow, carpenters were hammering together a big Italian trade fair. And in Washington, the White House was working hard on the possibility of talks with the Soviet Union about strategic nuclear missile and anti-missile systems.
