The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda
A succinct, pessimistic analysis of a horrifying episode in recent international politics. Kuperman starts by admitting frankly that he ended up in a different place than he began, concluding that even a massive Western intervention could have saved only a quarter (around 125,000) of the Tutsi lives lost in the massacres that swept Rwanda in 1994. His case is lucidly and powerfully presented, blending political and military analysis, and it is unrelentingly dark. Prevention is infinitely better than intervention -- which may in fact accelerate mass murder -- but it requires an almost impossible degree of foresight and acumen. Intervention may be better late than never, but it requires military effort on a scale and for a length of time that will make most developed countries' military staffs and politicians blanch. Essential if dispiriting reading for the tender-hearted and tough-minded alike.
Related
Advocates of humanitarian intervention often claim that 5,000 U.N. troops alone could have staved off the Rwandan genocide in 1994. But a more realistic appraisal suggests that an intervention of any size would have required much more time and logistical planning than most proponents care to admit. Given the genocide's terrifying pace, even a major mission by the West could have saved only a fraction of the ultimate victims. Herewith a reassessment of the limits of intervention.
Seven years after more than 500,000 Tutsi were massacred in Rwanda, the world still cannot explain why. Mahmood Mamdani's When Victims Become Killers is a rich history of Hutu and Tutsi identity, but how it applies to the genocide is unclear.
William Shawcross shows how U.N. peacekeeping has failed but does not draw the obvious conclusion: the world's hot spots need U.S. intervention, and plenty of it.
