The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises
It was not just Nixon. John F. Kennedy also secretly taped many White House meetings and phone calls, starting in July 1962, when he began to fear that a Cold War confrontation over Berlin was looming. Watergate put an end to the practice, of course, but ultimately historians must be as grateful about the secret recordings as Nixon was bitter. The transcripts of Kennedy's tapes are an astonishing primary source -- a must for diplomatic historians, Kennedy buffs, or any serious student of the Cold War. The tapes, painstakingly transcribed by a team of scholars at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs, let the reader be a fly on Camelot's wall -- and an uncommonly well-informed fly at that, thanks to bristling annotations and a companion cd-rom. In particular, readers get an unparalleled, hair-raising look at the Cuban missile crisis. The volumes supplant the less accurate transcripts in Zelikow and May's 1997 The Kennedy Tapes and show how Kennedy reined in generals hell-bent on military action. By chronicling the day-to-day blur so well, the transcripts tend to hide some of Kennedy's strategic blunders. But as a crisis manager, J.F.K. is seen here as the real thing: cool, salty, probing, and with a foreign policy range that can only make aides to the current commander in chief wince with comparative embarrassment. "You're in a pretty bad fix," Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay sneers to Kennedy during the Cuba showdown. "You're in there with me," Kennedy shoots back. With these transcripts, so is the reader.
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Washington bureaucrats will long remember John F. Kennedy as a President who stood them on their heads. Quick and impatient, he could not understand how Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon could take so long to answer his questions. Furthermore, he condoned unorthodox procedures on the grounds that order implied an absence of creativity. As Professor Neustadt has in effect pointed out, however, government officials prefer to go by the book. The result of this conflict was an encounter from which Washington has yet to recover.
