Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
This translated volume, first published in Russia in 1998, reflects the work of a new generation of scientifically adept Russian policy analysts. Like the large volumes by the National Resources Defense Council on nuclear stockpiles, this work is filled with detailed information on everything from the composition of the oxidizer in R-12 missiles (and their launch readiness) to the deployment of nuclear submarines to the organization of Russian nuclear forces. In 1999, the secret police confiscated the available Russian hard copies and the computer disks -- but not in time to deprive readers in the English-speaking world of a valuable reference work.
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Will Russia be run by democrats or oligarchs? The signs are worrying. The West would rather not dwell on the extent to which Russia's market is dominated by robber barons and permeated by crime and corruption. Russia's democracy is weak, with unfair election campaigns, a compromised media, and few checks on the presidency. The West cannot afford to let Russia descend into chaos, which might mean losing control of Russia's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, but its two-faced NATO expansion policy hurts the democrats' chances.
Gorbachev's foreign policy has the same aim as that of his predecessors, with the addition of tactical flexibility and sophisticated PR, and he is in more control of it. Arms control policy is the one difference, but he will get nowhere as long as he insists on linking progress with the banning of SDI.
Discusses (1) the size of Soviet military forces (nuclear, naval, air and ground) (2) the ideological drive behind Soviet defence policy (3) possible future doctrinal developments. Since the late 1970s, changing technology has stimulated doctrinal change, giving rise to concepts of multi-front operations. But the doctrinal vision is at the moment unrealisable, and the Soviets may thus be seeking to reduce nuclear arsenals, so as to make defence of the rear easier in wartime. Concludes that, in the light of the continuing ideological basis of Soviet doctrine, the West must be careful not to underestimate the danger which lies behind the undermining of deterrence through badly-conceived arms control measures. Director, National Security Agency, 1985-88. Very useful analysis, recommended.

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