Russia's Chechen Wars, 1994-2000: Lessons from Urban Combat
This slender monograph focuses on the Russian military's two efforts to seize Grozny. The first, in 1994, ended in humiliation and heavy loss; the second, in 1999-2000, succeeded only after many casualties and an enormous amount of destruction. Relying heavily on a close reading of the Russian press, the author makes the case that, with all its numerous and visible faults, the Russian army showed itself able to learn and adapt to the challenges of urban warfare. Despite its uneven use of advanced technology, she writes, the Russians have some hard-won lessons in urban combat that Western militaries would do well to study.
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The Chechnya misadventure unmasked what Russia's armed forces have known for awhile: the heir to the once-vaunted Soviet military is in shambles. Years of cutbacks in Russia's military budgets, worsened by rapid inflation, have crippled morale, the development of new weapons, maintenance, and training. At the upper echelons, there is now an exodus of talented and experienced officers; in the lower ranks, desertion and draft evasion are widespread. Nevertheless, the Russian military has largely remained above politics and helped to stabilize the nation amid reform. The United States would do well to press for an honest and open military-to-military relationship with Russia. One day, a grave nuclear threat may require it.
A pernicious mix of heavy-handed rule, corrupt governance, high unemployment, and militant Islam has reignited the Russian North Caucasus. Today, it is not only the old conflict zone of Chechnya but also its neighboring republics that are bordering on open civil war.
Why is Russia hopelessly mired in Chechnya? A new book skillfully details the history of the conflict, but it also goes astray in its often groundless invective.

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