Japan's unique economic system -- first created to help it through World War II -- served the country well for years, allowing for one of history's greatest booms. But now that same system has led Japan to the edge of economic collapse. Deep reforms are now critical. Making them will not be easy, but Japan no longer has a choice.
William H. Overholt is a Fellow at Harvard University's Asia Center. He has served as Chief Economist and Asia Strategist for three major investment banks based in Hong Kong and Singapore and is the author of The Rise of China.
ON THE BRINK
A major historical era is ending in Japan. Institutions that created the country's economic miracle a generation ago have now brought Japan to the verge of an economic debacle. And the changes needed to resolve that crisis will broadly affect the nation's economy, finances, politics, foreign policy, and family life.
The roots of the current malaise extend back to the years between 1937 and 1945, when most of the economic structures that still dominate Japan today were created. This "1940 system" was developed as a rational way to put Japan's economy on a wartime footing, and it served that purpose well. It also proved useful after the war; the 1940 system functioned brilliantly for many years after Japan's surrender, helping the country rebuild and leading to years of spectacular growth.
The same features that once did so much good for Japan, however, have now brought the nation to the brink of collapse. Thus the question today is no longer whether the country will reform its economy and finally abandon its wartime footing; Tokyo no longer has any choice. The question, rather, is how Japan will manage such a radical change, for the 1940 system has grown deeply entrenched in all aspects of Japanese society.
GUNS AND BUTTER
Wartime mobilization created many of the practices now regarded as distinctively Japanese and wove them into the 1940 system. As one authoritative study of the country describes,
Before the war it was common for employees to move from one enterprise to another, most industrial funding was secured through issues of stocks and bonds, and shareholders were granted high status in corporate governance. Frequent bankruptcies brought down businesses of all types, including banks, and the government introduced no economic planning or detailed regulations.
Such a chaotic system was, unsurprisingly, ill suited to the extreme demands of war. The solution was the creation of a new, highly centralized economy partly modeled on aspects of Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union. Among the changes introduced by the Japanese government were lifetime employment, seniority pay, company unions, firms that gave priority to employees over shareholders, government policies that put banks before capital markets, and the institutionalization of policy coordination between government and corporations.
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Japan's low wage and high productivity economy, which has depended on an export boom, is being challenged by other economies, and forced to adopt new strategies. One of these is 'going multi-national'. This is economically right but presents a social and psychological dilemma. It threatens the social harmony represented by life-long employments and circumscribes the ability of the Japanese to control their cultural destiny.
The West often ascribes mystery and chaos to political and economic power in Japan. Yet Japanese power is actually a carefully structured hierarchy, and the capstone is neither big business nor the Ministry of International Trade and Industry but the little-understood and low-profile Ministry of Finance. The MOF controls Japan's equivalents of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. It is the prime mover behind Japan's savings rate, distribution of overseas aid, and regulation of monopolies. However obscure, it may well be the most powerful bureaucracy in the world.
Future historians may well mark the mid-1980s as the time when Japan surpassed the United States to become the world's dominant economic power. Japan achieved superior industrial competitiveness several years earlier, but by the mid-1980s its high-technology exports to the United States far exceeded imports, and annual trade surpluses approached $50 billion a year. Meanwhile, America's trade deficits mushroomed to $150 billion a year. By late 1985, Japan's international lending already exceeded $640 billion, about ten percent more than America's, and it is growing rapidly. By 1986 the United States became the world's largest debtor nation and Japan surpassed the United States and Saudi Arabia to become the world's largest creditor.

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