For the first time, Latin America's two giants, Brazil and Mexico, are both looking for significant international roles -- but they are doing so in very different ways. Mexico has tied its future to economic integration with the United States, whereas Brazil seeks to be a leader in South America.
Peter Hakim is President of the Inter-American Dialogue.
THE DIFFERING PATHS OF MEXICO AND BRAZIL
For the first time ever, Latin America's two giants, Brazil and Mexico, are both looking beyond their borders for significant international roles. It is striking, however, how differently each is pursuing that goal. Mexico has linked its future to the United States and almost fully opened its economy to foreign trade and investment. Brazil, in contrast, remains a relatively closed economy, pursues an independent leadership role in South America, and is seen by the United States as an opponent on some issues.
Mexico's choices have clearly been influenced by the fact that it sits in the shadow of the world's richest and most powerful nation. Brazil, a continent-sized nation located some 2,400 miles from the United States and surrounded by ten smaller neighbors, has a rather different perspective on the world. Yet until recently, it was Mexico that most zealously shielded its independence from the United States.
Geography, to be sure, has played a major role in the pursuit of these divergent paths. But domestic politics and national ideologies have also been critical in molding the agendas of the two nations. Brazilian political leaders and thinkers, and even ordinary citizens, have long believed that their country should be counted among the world's most important states. Mexicans, meanwhile, historically have been less concerned about their place in the world than about their relations with the United States. Moreover, until Vicente Fox assumed the presidency in December 2000, Mexico was ruled by authoritarian and centralized governments. Recent Brazilian governments, on the other hand, have been more democratic than their Mexican counterparts but also weaker and more susceptible to popular pressure.
A CERTAIN SIMILARITY
Brazil and Mexico have enough demographic and economic heft to exert real influence in international affairs. At the outset of 2001, Brazil was the fifth most populous country and had the eighth-largest economy in the world. Mexico was the eleventh most populous and had the twelfth-largest economy. (Currency fluctuations in the past year have left the two economies about the same size in dollar terms, although Brazil's domestic purchasing power remains much larger.) On a per capita basis, their ranking falls considerably, but by World Bank standards they are comfortably upper-middle-income countries.
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The United States is spreading its aid and efforts too thin in the developing world. It should focus on a small number of "pivotal states": countries whose fate determines the survival and success of the surrounding region and ultimately the stability of the international system. The list should include Mexico, Brazil, Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Turkey, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia. A discriminating strategy for shoring up the developing world is a wise way to address traditional security threats and new transnational issues; it might be thought of as the new, improved domino theory. If effective, it could forestall the move in Congress to wipe out nearly all foreign aid.
The Salinas regime has ardently pursued the North American Free Trade Agreement as a silver bullet to kill myriad political and economic problems. But NAFTA as it stands would exacerbate many of Mexico's enduring disparities and injustices. Short term adjustment costs and the possibility of backsliding on political reform have largely been overlooked. NAFTA must be designed to contribute to political reform. Otherwise, postponing the accord would not weaken Mexico-only Salinas.
Covers US foreign policy in Latin America during 1988, discussing (1) Nicaragua (2) Panama and the Noriega problem (3) drug trafficking (4) the progress towards democracy (5) the debt crisis. Concludes that future US policy will have to centre around Mexico and the Caribbean basin, but that this should not obscure America's long-term interest in a steadily-improving economic situation throughout Latin America.

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