Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power
This book is more than a contribution to the "decisive battles of Western history" genre, for the author has chosen the word "landmark" with care. He describes vividly more than two millennia of battles to underscore an overarching theme: the West's enduring military superiority. Not surprisingly for a prolific historian of ancient Greece, Hanson believes that the roots of Western military predominance lie with Hellenic culture and its legacies, particularly its brand of rational, purposive thought, which rejects excessive reliance on theology, custom, and tyrannical politics. The tradition of "civic militarism" -- that is, the West's ability to mobilize citizen soldiers and animate them with the discipline of collective endeavor -- has helped create an ascendancy that remains, in Hanson's view, secure. In the resurrected "clash of civilizations" debate, this work is for those who think "the West versus the rest" captures the issue. A powerful argument that the smart money remains with the West.
Related
In many areas, transatlantic cooperation is stronger than ever before. Yet the common perception is of an increasingly fraught relationship, as evidenced by the well-known disputes over beef, bananas, and burden sharing. Assumptions are diverging over security risks and cultural values. Each side criticizes the other's unwieldy policymaking process without admitting its own shortcomings, while leaders pander to domestic interests and prejudices without educating voters on international issues. Europe nonetheless remains indispensable to a multilateral U.S. foreign policy. The Bush administration must acknowledge the European Union as a true partner, in political and military matters as well as in economics. America cannot expect its allies to share the burdens of global leadership without allowing them their say in the issues at stake.
The Congress of Vienna, the Treaty of Versailles, and the NATO-based containment strategy were three pivotal decisions in European diplomacy. Now there is a fourth opportunity to construct a lasting European peace through institutions, new and old. Foremost, NATO must expand, discussing openly which new countries to admit. The Partnership for Peace and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe should coordinate human rights and civilian control of armies. Respect for human rights must extend to Russia, which is why the Chechen campaign has been so disturbing. To turn away from the challenge of this moment and freeze NATO would exact a higher price later.
Before World War I, German planners prepared for only one contingency: an all-out, two-front war. In July 1914, this made it difficult for Germany to match Russia's military preparations without automatically escalating into general war. Before World War II, French military planners also prepared for only one contingency: full-scale invasion of France. This made it difficult for France to react effectively when Hitler occupied the Rhineland in 1936. Both the German and French governments went wrong by assuming, rather than judging, where the main threat lay. Each country put tremendous effort into elaborating its war plans and force structure, down to the most minute detail. And yet each seems to have given only the most cursory attention to the political contingencies in which those plans and forces might have to be used. Hence the plans and force structures turned out to be not only irrelevant but-because of their rigidity-downright harmful.

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