Theodore Rex
Morris elicited much controversy and scorn for his 1999 biography of Ronald Reagan, Dutch. Put that argument to one side. This well-written book is a superior account of the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, backed by first-rate research. Above all, Morris finds a rare balance that blends personal story with policy analysis, judiciously sifting the key issues of the Roosevelt administration. His interpretations of the crisis with Germany over Venezuela, the building of the Panama Canal, and the mediation of the Russo-Japanese War are sound without being heavy-handed. He has a good sense for the process of diplomacy at that time as well as for the underlying substance. George W. Bush has announced that he enjoyed this book. Reading it was a good use of his time. A century ago, the United States was entering a new era as it tried to define a global role. Thanks in large part to the force of Roosevelt's own intellect and style -- which was much more carefully calculated than contemporaries realized -- America emerged as a great and respected power in a rapidly changing world.
Related
A new survey of U.S. public opinion on foreign policy shows that the war in Iraq and terrorism are not the only problems on Americans' minds. Public concern over the United States' dependence on foreign oil may soon force policymakers to change course. And religious Americans are rethinking their support for many of Bush's policies, which has brought them closer in line with the rest of the public.
How Many Casualties Will Americans Tolerate?
Misdiagnosis
CHRISTOPHER GELPI
In "The Iraq Syndrome" (November/December 2005), John Mueller argues that public support for the American wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq can be explained with "a simple association: as casualties mount, support decreases." He goes on to say that support for the Iraq war has dropped so fast that it makes sense to talk about an "Iraq syndrome," a casualty-induced aversion to the future use of force by the United States.
Public support for the war in Iraq has followed the same course as it did for the wars in Korea and Vietnam: broad enthusiasm at the outset with erosion of support as casualties mount. The experience of those past wars suggests that there is nothing President Bush can do to reverse this deterioration -- or to stave off an "Iraq syndrome" that could inhibit U.S. foreign policy for decades to come.
