Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia
Rashid, the author of the best book on the Taliban (reviewed in Foreign Affairs in MayffiJune 2000), has again produced a fine study. This achievement is no mean task. Rashid not only treats the five separate "stans" but also their various Islamist movements, not to mention the neighboring and outside states involved in Central Asia. Part I outlines Central Asia's geography and its millennial history, followed by the period of Russian and Soviet domination, and finally the first decade of independence. Part II discusses the several Islamist movements in Central Asia and their tangled ties with each other, the Central Asian states, the Taliban, and others. Two following chapters then tackle Central Asia's role in international politics; a concluding essay assesses future prospects. Rashid's analysis offers subtle greys, touching on the repressive Central Asian regimes now on "our side" against terrorism, the dangerous Islamist movements whose popularity is enhanced by that repression, and outsiders seeking to inaugurate a new "great game" for control over oil and pipelines. A better future, Rashid notes, will require cooperative policies by all, with more attention paid to human rights and economic development.
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Across one of the world's most sensitive regions, radical Islam and repressive politics are gaining ground. As they consolidate their power over Afghanistan, the Taliban are starting to destabilize the entire surrounding area -- and beyond. Muslim fundamentalists from around the globe study revolution under their tutelage, rebel armies find sanctuary on their turf, and the drugs and other goods that are smuggled out of the country are undermining the economies of Afghanistan's Central Asian neighbors. The Great Game has changed, and the West must learn the new rules.
The first engagement in the new war on terrorism -- with Osama bin Ladin in Afghanistan -- poses severe challenges for the United States. Rooting out bin Ladin's network will require military success in a country that the Soviet Union could not conquer in ten years of trying, as well as support from unstable surrounding nations. Washington may be tempted to try to oust the Taliban regime, but doing so could rekindle Afghanistan's brutal civil war. The United States must proceed with caution -- or end up on the ash heap of Afghan history.
Asks whether the Reykjavik summit and Irangate have shaken the USA's self-confidence and standing in the world. Reykjavik threatened the credibility of the West's flexible response strategy, while Irangate undermined the authority of the President, made a nonsense of his anti-terrorism campaign, and embarrassed and angered his Middle Eastern allies. On the other hand, the USSR is no longer in a position to gain from these blunders.
