Islam and Salvation in Palestine: The Islamic Jihad Movement
Hatina offers a measured, dispassionate account of the Palestinian extremist group Islamic Jihad, which emerged in the 1980s and claims to have started the first intifada in 1987. Tiny by comparison with Hamas, it is even more radical. Islamic Jihad's "internal charter" (translated selections of which are found in a useful appendix) views Palestine as sacred, and armed struggle as the only means to liberate it. The struggle is directed against "the triple heresy and oppression of the West, the Arab regimes, and Israel."
It lauds martyrdom (and thus suicide bombings) and rejects any negotiation or truce with the enemy. Islamic Jihad has consistently embraced Iran's hard-liners and has received support from Tehran. The ideology of Islamic Jihad and the challenges that it poses to both the Palestine Liberation Organization (and the Palestinian Authority) and Hamas are well presented. One might have included some indication of Islamic Jihad's numerical strength, but the only numbers offered are for student elections at the Islamic University in Gaza -- which give Islamic Jihad 4-10 percent, compared to 60 percent for Hamas.
Related
In his article "Europe's Angry Muslims" (July/August 2005), Robert Leiken argues that European Muslims are "distinct, cohesive, and bitter." He later writes that Islamist terrorist groups should not be compared with marginal European terrorist groups because Islamist terrorists have a "social base" from which to operate. The implied claim that all European Muslims are or could be supporters of terrorists (if they are not terrorists themselves) needs to be answered.
The mantra that the war on terrorism is not a war on Islam ignores one crucial fact: Islam and politics are inextricably linked throughout the Muslim world. Islamism includes Osama bin Laden and the Taliban but also moderates and liberals. In fact, it can be whatever Muslims want it to be. Rather than push secularism, the West should help empower the silent Muslim majority that rejects radicalism and violence. The result could be political systems both truly Islamist and truly democratic.
Even if Yemen manages to avoid civil war, the country's many economic and security challenges may undermine democratic reform. In setting the post-Saleh agenda, will Yemen's disparate opposition movements be able to outmaneuver the country's established powers?

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