Strategy, Money, and the New Look, 1953-1956
The third volume in the massive official history of the office of the secretary of defense, this book upholds the same weighty standards of integrity and thoroughness as its predecessors. It summarizes one of the most interesting periods in Cold War defense policy, when American planners settled in for the long competition with the Soviet Union, adapted to new technologies (particularly in the nuclear realm), and cut force size while embarking on what is known today as "defense transformation." Intercontinental ballistic missiles, continental air defense, the permanent stationing of U.S. forces in Europe, and the Army's revolt against massive retaliation are all impartially examined by a dedicated historian who has been at the job since World War II. If policymakers had time to read big books, this one should be high on their required list.
Related
Whether or not the United States today should be called an empire is a semantic game. The important point is that it resembles previous empires enough to make the search for lessons of history worthwhile. Overwhelming dominance has always invited hostility. U.S. leaders thus must learn the arts of imperial management and diplomacy, exercising power with a bland smile rather than boastful words.
Despite a vast budget that dwarfs the military spending power of both friends and foes, the U.S. military today remains stuck in the past. American strategy still relies on a Cold War-era view of the world, and U.S. technology is ill-suited to current missions. Meanwhile, demoralization is creeping through the ranks. The next president must seize the opportunity to remake the military by forcing it to focus on the missions of the future rather than those of the past. The alternative -- more of the same -- is too dangerous to consider.
Donald Rumsfeld has gotten better press as a secretary of war than he did as a secretary of defense. But the latter job is tougher, so he deserves some sympathy. The dilemmas of U.S. defense policy today reflect more than individual foibles and the difficulty of transforming a giant, often dysfunctional bureaucracy. Even more important, they stem from America's profoundly ambivalent and only semiconscious acceptance of its unique, world-historical role. Whatever the pace at which the Pentagon adapts to that fact, it must do so, and the more swiftly the better.

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