Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf
All three of these war-making episodes have a large literature. Hess has now brought them together, relying on the original research of other scholars, summarizing the events with skill, and appraising each president's performance with common questions about motive, reasoning, management, regard for constitutional processes, and public leadership. The book's strength is that Hess has done this job well and compactly. His appraisals are thoughtful, not showy. Throughout he reveals the shadow of "Munich" -- the sense of regional aggression presenting tests of global credibility. Among Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson, and George H.W. Bush, Hess gives Bush the highest marks in setting deliberate goals and managing the government to attain them. Some of the most interesting analysis concerns Truman: Hess is too hard on the president's decision to let U.S. troops cross the 38th parallel in September 1950, but he is otherwise on target in showing why Truman so thoroughly, perhaps deservedly, lost the support of the American people.
Related
Americans tend to think there is a solution to every problem. In a corollary-equally misleading though not unnatural, given the unrivaled material strength of the United States-they imagine that when the problem is international the solution to it will be American. Most international problems, however, do not have final solutions. Only a Carthaginian peace is final; and short of that, as even unconditional enemy surrenders have demonstrated, the distribution of rewards and punishments soon turns out to have results very different from those the victors foresaw or desired. Applying these truths to the situation in Viet Nam, we must reconcile ourselves to the fact that there is not a final solution to the war there; that neither a preliminary nor a lasting solution will be determined by the amount of force which we are able or willing to use; and that in neither case will it correspond to our idea of "victory."
In taking the war upon himself, Robert S. McNamara forgets that containment abroad and anticommunism at home virtually ensured the Vietnam tragedy.
Nineteen sixty-nine may be remembered as the year Americans woke up to the importance of an issue that was to be a dominant one in the 1970s. The question of Viet Nam still had the emotional clout. The great ABM debate still captured most of the headlines. But more and more people were beginning to see that bigger and more permanent than both of these was the question of whether America's military spending could be brought under more rational control. In the winter of 1969 it became increasingly clear that we had to find a way to reorient our national priorities so that imperative human needs on the home front were not always being shunted aside because of the claims of "national security." No longer could it be successfully argued that we could afford the needed amounts of "guns and butter." A difficult choice-or at least choices-had to be made, and would have to be made repeatedly, for many years to come.
