Afghanistan's peace remains tenuous. Rival warlords still control separate militias, and distrust of government abounds. Only a national army can secure the peace. Yet the Afghans have been slow to create one, and the international community has not helped much. The United States must jump-start the process before war breaks out again.
Anja Manuel is an Attorney with Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. P. W. Singer is Olin Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution and Coordinator of the Brookings Project on U.S. Policy Towards the Islamic World.
Manuel and Singer's second postscript to their July/August 2002 essay "A New Model Afghan Army."
ReadAN UNEASY PEACE
An unforeseen result of the U.S. military's stunning success in Afghanistan was the overnight suspension of that country's vicious, 23-year-old civil war. Afghanistan's future -- including whether it again degenerates into a terrorist base -- now largely depends on what is made of this precious opportunity.
In countries recovering from civil war, the most critical requirement for long-term peace is the demobilization of the formerly warring parties and their integration within a unified military. Angola and the former Yugoslavia provide cautionary tales about the difficulties of military reintegration; Mozambique and South Africa give more hopeful examples of how building a cohesive army can help solidify peace after a national conflict.
In Afghanistan, the process of military integration has barely begun, but it is already close to collapse. Not only are perennial ethnic, factional, and religious disputes hampering progress, but the political elements of postwar transition are moving ahead without the requisite military corollary. Indeed, the interim administration inaugurated in December 2001 never answered basic questions about the size, composition, and tasks of a national army. Meanwhile, the international community remains ambivalent about how it will assist, and what little aid it has promised has been slow in coming.
The dangers of continued delay are growing by the day. The U.S. and allied forces entered Afghanistan to rout the Taliban and al Qaeda; demobilizing the country's many warring factions was not on the agenda. Thus, the operations may have abruptly suspended the civil war, but they have created only a tacit truce without dismantling the full war-fighting capabilities of the armed groups. Many of these groups may now be tempted to either reject the peace process or manipulate it to their advantage. If they do, Afghanistan could plunge straight back into war.
MOTLEY CREW
Log in to continue reading
Access to this article requires a one-time free registration. To register, click here.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
As Afghanistan has shown, keeping the peace in foreign lands requires a variety of tools--some of which Washington just does not have. Rather than avoid peacekeeping entirely, the U.S. government ends up sending in elite military units that get bogged down for years. Developing a constabulary force would be a better answer.
With its new policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Obama administration has taken ownership of an orphaned conflict. But can it achieve victory, and how?
The accords were signed in 1988 by Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the USA and USSR as 'states guarantors'. They preclude Pakistani assistance to the Afghan resistance, but do not mention the Soviet involvement other than stating a timetable for troop withdrawals, whilst a voluntary repatriation of refugees is to be effected within a stated period. Gives detailed background to their signature. Charges that Afghanistan has been 'sovietized' so that the regime will not fall apart. Warns of a "repetition of the Ethiopian tragedy" in respect of the refugees. The accords have provided for "the long-term Soviet consolidation of control".
