A debate is unfolding over a new IMF proposal to avert future Argentina-style financial meltdowns: an international "Chapter 11" that would let a country declare bankruptcy, just like a troubled firm. Such a plan would represent an improvement over the current approach -- but it will not eliminate financial crises altogether.
Richard N. Cooper is Maurits C. Boas Professor of International Economics at Harvard University and a regular book reviewer for Foreign Affairs.
DISHONOR BEFORE DEBT
Late in 2001, the new first deputy managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Anne Krueger, made a bold suggestion. Under certain conditions, she proposed, a government's international debt repayments should be temporarily suspended while negotiations take place on restructuring that debt. With her statement, the IMF officially endorsed one of the more radical suggestions for improving the international financial architecture to have come forth since the Mexican and Asian crises in the 1990s. If implemented properly, the Krueger proposal would represent some improvement over the IMF's current prescriptions for states facing financial collapse. But given the domestic origins of most financial crises, her plan cannot eliminate them altogether.
The problem that Krueger addressed is straightforward. When any debtor nation develops economic difficulties, its creditors worry about being repaid, so they move as quickly as they can to protect their positions. For example, they can decline to roll over (that is, extend) loans that have matured. They may even sell the loans before maturity, although that move, of course, requires willing buyers. The difficulty that some governments faced in rolling over maturing debt played an important role in several recent debt crises: Mexico (1994-95), Russia (1998), Brazil (1998-99), and Argentina (2001-2). Even those creditors willing to roll over their loans at a satisfactory interest rate may hesitate for fear of being alone -- and thus caught in a payments crisis.
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Since its creation, the IMF has seen its global mission overcome by floating exchange rates and immense private capital markets. Consequently, it has focused more on the developing world, become more politicized, and wandered into riskier endeavors such as Mexico's bailout. Nevertheless, the IMF can and should be reformed to become a global rating agency, a bankruptcy judge for nations, and an international catalyst for aid and financial packages.
The debt containment policy conceived in 1982, under which repayments were financed by the creation of trade surpluses, has run its course. The question now is not only whether the big debtors will pay, but where the money will come from. There is an urgent need for innovative financial mechanisms. The new strategy should include economic reform in debtor countries, new capital in-flows and, if necessary, workable formulae for interest deferral.
The international financial community can assess its management of the international debt "crisis" of 1982-83 with a certain sense of satisfaction. Creative ad hoc solutions to individual countries' problems kept adequate credit flowing. Unpredecented cooperation among the International Monetary Fund (IMF), central banks, and private lenders restored confidence and prevented the "crisis" from playing out to a tragic conclusion--massive defaults, the freezing of new credit, bank failures, and perhaps ultimately a worldwide depression.
