Not So Fast
What should the United States do about Iraq? Hawks are wrong to think the problem is desperately urgent or connected to terrorism, but right to see the prospect of a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein as so worrisome that it requires drastic action. Doves are right about Iraq's not being a good candidate for an Afghan-style war, but wrong to think that inspections and deterrence alone can contain Saddam. The United States has no choice left but to invade Iraq itself and eliminate the current regime.
To the Editor:
Kenneth Pollack's recent article ("Next Stop Baghdad?" March/April 2002) presents a strong case for invading Iraq. Yet ultimately it is not persuasive, for it rests on a series of questionable assumptions about Saddam Hussein.
The most important of these assumptions is that Saddam is a risk-taker and therefore cannot be reliably deterred; hence a policy of containment is doomed to failure. This view, however, ignores the defining feature of Saddam Hussein: his deeply ingrained instinct for survival. Thus far, his regime has survived a destructive and ultimately inconclusive war with Iran, a devastating defeat in the Persian Gulf War, several U.S.-inspired coup attempts, a series of armed rebellions, an unknown (but probably high) number of assassination attempts, and more than a decade of crippling economic sanctions. Throughout this multitude of tribulations, Saddam has maintained, perhaps even increased, his tenacious grip on power.
Few could question that Saddam's survival instinct is finely honed, yet it is precisely this desire (and capacity) to survive that provides the key to dealing with Saddam. If confronted with a specific demand coupled with a credible threat to punish noncompliance with massive military force, Saddam's track record indicates that he will back down. If confronted with a military invasion with the express purpose of removing him from power, Saddam will have nothing to lose by rolling the dice.
His most plausible opening gambit would be an attack on Israel with the intention of broadening the war beyond the borders of Iraq. Saddam's deeply rooted desire to survive means that he can be deterred and therefore contained -- so long as it is done in the right way. Moreover, this same desire means that any military operation that seeks to remove him will be fraught with danger.
Liam Anderson
Assistant Professor of Political Science, Wright State University
Related
What should the United States do about Iraq? Hawks are wrong to think the problem is desperately urgent or connected to terrorism, but right to see the prospect of a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein as so worrisome that it requires drastic action. Doves are right about Iraq's not being a good candidate for an Afghan-style war, but wrong to think that inspections and deterrence alone can contain Saddam. The United States has no choice left but to invade Iraq itself and eliminate the current regime.
"The American way of war" refers to the grinding strategy of attrition that U.S. generals traditionally employed to prevail in combat. But that was then. Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the new American way of war relies on speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. This approach was put on display in the invasion of Iraq and should reshape what the military looks like.
Over 70 years ago, the United Kingdom's occupation of Iraq proved so unpopular at home that London had to declare success and head for the exit. The British pulled out early, and chaos followed in their wake. If Washington hopes for better, it should study this example to learn how -- and how not -- to end an occupation.

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