Can the EU Hack the Balkans?: A Proving Ground for Brussels
Once again, history is being written in the Balkans. This perennial hotspot is becoming a testing ground for Brussels--and for a new transatlantic relationship.
Morton Abramowitz is Senior Fellow at the Century Foundation and a member of the Executive Committee of the International Crisis Group. Heather Hurlburt was until June 2002 Deputy Director of the ICG's Washington, D.C., office.
The sight of Slobodan Milosevic being tried for war crimes in the Hague may suggest that we have reached the end of history, Balkans-style. The prospects of large-scale conflict in the region are low; democracy and pluralism are slowly taking root; and the Balkans' claim on the world's attention, declining even before September 11, continues to fall. Over the next two to three years, NATO will likely reduce its peacekeeping presence further, foreign aid will decline, and international attention will continue to drift elsewhere.
The Bush administration has led the exodus, progressively turning over Balkans responsibilities -- both long-term development and short-term crisis management -- to the European Union. The EU, for its part, is eager to take the reins. It has already stepped in to keep Serbia and Montenegro together in some fashion and declared itself available to replace NATO peacekeepers in Macedonia.
One of the twentieth century's most troubled areas thus gets a new shot at the history books, as a proving ground for a new partnership between the United States and the EU. This time, however, Europe is in the lead. The stakes are high -- for regional stability, to be sure, but also for the future of a serious European foreign policy and a newly balanced transatlantic relationship. The question, therefore, is no longer whether Europe can succeed in the Balkans; for its own sake, if not for America's, Europe must succeed there.
Yet at the same time as the EU is acquiring greater responsibility for Balkan affairs, it finds itself absorbed in internal debates over expansion, constitutional revision, and pressing global matters such as the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Moreover, despite efforts at streamlining, the EU's weakness in security and foreign policymaking remains obvious, and strengthening European capabilities in these areas will take years. Thus, Brussels' ability to handle the assortment of challenges it has taken on in southeastern Europe, and Washington's willingness and ability to be an effective junior (but still prodding) partner, remain very much in doubt.
STATE OF THE UNION
This is a premium article
You must be a logged in Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you wish to continue reading this article please subscribe , or activate your online account to get full online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
It is well to check one's conclusions against the sweep of events over time. The newspapers must make their daily judgments; the columnists their biweekly syntheses; the monthlies content themselves with prediction of the future or explanation of the past. All of this misses the continuum of events. Those of each day, month and year grow out of what has gone before and will mark, shape and condition what comes after them.
The greatest threat to the authority of European states comes not from Brussels but from within. Northern Italy, the Rhone-Alpes, proud Catalonia, and other economically and culturally vibrant regions are asserting their identity and taking advantage of European integration to develop ties across national frontiers. Regions are opening embassies abroad and negotiating their own trade agreements, while cities link themselves in state-of-the-art transportation networks and court foreign business. As central governments worldwide lose credibility, regionalism appears to be the coming dynamic, nowhere more than in Europe.
Tony Judt is right to have doubts about the future of European union, but his jeremiad lacks an eye for detail.

Sign-up for free weekly updates from ForeignAffairs.com.