Can the EU Hack the Balkans?: A Proving Ground for Brussels

The sight of Slobodan Milosevic being tried for war crimes in the Hague may suggest that we have reached the end of history, Balkans-style. The prospects of large-scale conflict in the region are low; democracy and pluralism are slowly taking root; and the Balkans' claim on the world's attention, declining even before September 11, continues to fall. Over the next two to three years, NATO will likely reduce its peacekeeping presence further, foreign aid will decline, and international attention will continue to drift elsewhere.

The Bush administration has led the exodus, progressively turning over Balkans responsibilities -- both long-term development and short-term crisis management -- to the European Union. The EU, for its part, is eager to take the reins. It has already stepped in to keep Serbia and Montenegro together in some fashion and declared itself available to replace NATO peacekeepers in Macedonia.

One of the twentieth century's most troubled areas thus gets a new shot at the history books, as a proving ground for a new partnership between the United States and the EU. This time, however, Europe is in the lead. The stakes are high -- for regional stability, to be sure, but also for the future of a serious European foreign policy and a newly balanced transatlantic relationship. The question, therefore, is no longer whether Europe can succeed in the Balkans; for its own sake, if not for America's, Europe must succeed there.

Yet at the same time as the EU is acquiring greater responsibility for Balkan affairs, it finds itself absorbed in internal debates over expansion, constitutional revision, and pressing global matters such as the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Moreover, despite efforts at streamlining, the EU's weakness in security and foreign policymaking remains obvious, and strengthening European capabilities in these areas will take years. Thus, Brussels' ability to handle the assortment of challenges it has taken on in southeastern Europe, and Washington's willingness and ability to be an effective junior (but still prodding) partner, remain very much in doubt.

STATE OF THE UNION