The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq
The instant book has a bad name, and no doubt some critics will view this work -- written before a war, not in its immediate aftermath -- with grave suspicion. It is nonetheless exceptionally thoughtful. If any book can shape the current thinking on Iraq, this one will assuredly be it. The author made his reputation as a young CIA analyst who predicted Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. He has since worked in think tanks and on the National Security Council and has long been a prominent voice in this debate. He walks his reader through a brief history of the Ba'athist Iraqi state, the Gulf War, and the tortured history of Iraq's relations with the world since 1991. He examines the options for dealing with Saddam Hussein and boils them down to two: deterrence or invasion. The former, he argues, is the riskier course, because the Iraqi dictator has consistently flouted the rules of rational calculation beloved by political scientists. Pollack is sober about the dangers, costs, and implications of invasion but ends by concluding that it is the best option. This well-written work will no doubt attract much controversy. But it will be indispensable, even for those who disagree with its conclusions.
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Most discussions of U.S. policy in Iraq assume that it should be informed by the lessons of Vietnam. But the conflict in Iraq today is a communal civil war, not a Maoist "people's war," and so those lessons are not valid. "Iraqization," in particular, is likely to make matters worse, not better.
Every president since Richard Nixon has recognized that ensuring stability in the Persian Gulf is a vital U.S. interest. In its first term, the Clinton administration attempted to deal with the twin dangers of Iran and Iraq through a strategy of "dual containment" that kept both countries boxed in with economic sanctions and military monitoring. Dual containment, however, is more a slogan than a strategy, and far too blunt an instrument to serve American interests in the Middle East. The United States must employ a more nuanced approach, keeping the straitjacket on Saddam while seeking improved relations with Iran.
After the Cold War, the demands on American leadership are no less stern than they were in Dean Acheson's day. Present again at the creation, U.S. diplomacy must pass a series of tests -- of vision, pragmatism, spine, and principle -- to build a foundation for a new world. This will mean encouraging democracy, stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, working to shore up the international financial system, engaging Beijing, and standing up to Baghdad and Belgrade. But America needs resources to lead, and Congress has foreign policy living hand-to-mouth. America cannot afford to abdicate its world role.
