Reconcilable Differences: U.S.-French Relations in the New Era
Despite its title, this book's action occurs largely in Brussels rather than in Washington or Paris. The approach works, since postwar U.S. and French governments have largely engaged each other through their Western alliance rather than through bilateral channels. This history is well established but has not featured as prominently in previous discussions as it does in this volume, and Brenner and Parmentier chart new territory in their analysis of its consequences for the future. Indeed, they make a convincing case that the Washington-Paris-Brussels triangle could prove the ultimate savior of the perennially troubled relations between these two partners. By embedding its interests within a common European position, France carves out greater space for itself to act independently of U.S. influence, creating "disincentives for the United States to attack Paris-based initiatives." In return, however, Paris must use its strong position within Europe to help promote the U.S. interest in having "an EU that is an open, constructive partner." The section on NATO is particularly strong. The authors harshly criticize U.S. and French policymakers (while not absolving their alliance partners) for a string of "missed opportunities" to give the alliance a post-Cold War purpose and structure. Readers may be frustrated, however, with the somewhat confused policy recommendations in the final chapter. The authors contradict themselves by first advocating "a bilateral relationship clear in purpose and consistent in method," and in the next breath arguing that "collaboration on a case-by-case" basis would be preferable to a "routinized partnership." But such a quibble hardly detracts from the value of this detailed, nuanced, and innovative work.
Related
In a major address on July 4, 1962, the President called for a partnership between the United States and Europe. With the passage of the Trade Bill this "great design" seems to have come a step closer. To many, the Atlantic Community beckons as the great hope of the 1960s. The possibility of establishing a vital Atlantic system is indeed one of the great opportunities of our time. It may well be that to future historians it will appear the distinctive feature of our decade, far transcending in importance the crises which form the headlines of the day.
Both the United States and France benefited from the geopolitical freeze during the Cold War. Now that the bipolar stalemate is over, Germany is preoccupied with reunification, England is economically hobbled and blanches at the European Community, and migration of the rising populations of North Africa and the Middle East may soon threaten more disruption than post-Soviet states. France alone among its neighbors has the desire, ambition and means to lead the reordering of Europe's security. Yet its efforts must fuse with U.S. policy, not snuff it out.
The two world wars are the mountain ranges that dominate the historical landscape of the twentieth century. We still live in their shadows, in America as well as in Europe. Only with these wars did European and American history begin to coincide. The revolutions of 1820, 1830, 1848 and the wars leading to the unification of Italy and Germany marked the nineteenth century in European history, while the major events in American history were the westward movement, the Civil War and mass immigration. These events had certain transatlantic connections, yet not decisive ones. But in the twentieth century the two world wars have been the main events in the history of Europe and America as well.
