Nearly a quarter-century after the revolution, economic failure and a bankrupt ideology have discredited the Islamic Republic. Despite the attention paid to a clash between "reformers" and "conservatives" in the government, the real story in Iran is the growing discontent among the generation born after 1979. This "Third Force" will eventually topple the regime, and the United States should just watch and wait.
Jahangir Amuzegar is an international economic consultant. He was Finance Minister and Economic Ambassador in Iran's pre-1979 government.
Amuzegar's postscript to his January/February 2003 essay "Iran's Crumbling Revolution."
ReadAMERICA AND THE AYATOLLAHS
Western reporters tend to describe the current situation in Iran in alarmist terms, suggesting that the people are near revolt, the regime faces collapse, and the country is prone to political upheaval. Even if these assessments are premature or extreme, the relentless confrontations between the "reformist" Majles (national assembly) and the "conservative" Council of Guardians (which has veto power over Majles legislation and vets all candidates for elective office) augur a turbulent political future. The 1979 revolution faces a profound challenge from a new and disenchanted generation, widely known in Iran as "the Third Force." For this broad swath of society born after 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's promise of a just and free Islamic society has proven a sham. After nearly a quarter-century of theocratic rule, Iran is now by all accounts politically repressed, economically troubled, and socially restless. And the ruling clerical oligarchy lacks any effective solutions for these ills.
The changes wrought by this turmoil call for a new and nuanced U.S. policy toward the Islamic Republic -- particularly if the United States goes to war against Iraq. Since the high-profile inclusion of Iran in President George W. Bush's "axis of evil," proposals to deal with that "rogue" state have run the gamut from a preemptive military strike to the pursuit of diplomatic engagement. Between these two extremes, suggestions have included covert action to destabilize the ruling regime, assistance to internal and external opposition groups, financial aid for foreign-based Iranian media, and a call for international condemnation of the ayatollahs. To know what shape U.S. policy should take, however, it is necessary to understand how Iran arrived at its current parlous state.
THE BEST OF ENEMIES
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Both in public and underground, Iranians are debating the legitimacy of the Islamic state that Khomeini built. Students challenge the notion that Islam has all the answers but evince pride in an Iran free of the shah and under no foreign master. The religious and secular elites are increasingly willing to contemplate pluralism and openness to the world, though most makers of the revolution remain obdurate and appeal to anti-Americanism to stir up the masses. Washington needs to listen to the new voices of Iran.
Anxious to turn back a string of recent victories by President Mohammad Khatami and his reformist allies, Iran's conservatives have embarked on a campaign of bloody repression. As the two camps battle for control of the Islamic Republic, the proper moves from Washington just might tip the balance. Modest engagement can help Iran's moderates help themselves.
In Iran today, defiant new movements are blossoming. They put the country on the cutting edge of the Islamic world on issues ranging from religious reform and cultural expression to women's rights. The theocratic regime that seized power in 1979 is unlikely to survive, but the driving force behind that revolution is prompting ordinary Iranians to go out and get what they need for themselves.

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