While America Slept: Understanding Terrorism and Counterterrorism

After describing the history and motivations of al Qaeda, the first half of the book ends with a chapter titled "Fields of Jihad." It quickly reviews the status of Islamists across the Muslim world, assessing the power of jihadists in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinian territories, Pakistan, and Central Asia, among others. But Benjamin and Simon end the section with a reminder that radical Islamists live in Western societies too, not only among immigrant Muslim communities but also as converts. The lesson is that we must think less about the Muslim world and more about radical Muslims in the world. Geography may matter less and less as this struggle continues.

Benjamin and Simon deserve praise not only for the powerful content of their study of terror, but also for how they went about it. For instance, they uncovered some of the links between early Islamic theology and al Qaeda by sifting through documents from the trials of defendants in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1998 East African embassy bombings. They demonstrate an original synthesis of academic research, textual analysis, and investigative reporting. For its thoroughness, graceful prose, and important insights, the first half of the book is impressive.

INSIDE THE WATCHTOWER

The latter half of The Age of Sacred Terror presents Benjamin and Simon's insider story of working on counterterrorism in the U.S. government. The account tells us a great deal, and those who served in other parts of the bureaucracy or even elsewhere on the NSC staff (as this reviewer did) would agree with much of it. Yet one cannot escape the sense that the second half of the book, written breathlessly after September 11, has a different tone and purpose, and therefore quality, than the first 200 pages.

Benjamin and Simon set out to show that a small group of officials "got it" and worked to galvanize the rest of the bureaucracy to focus on the rising threat from terrorism. Their story indirectly makes an effective argument for keeping some staffers on the same brief for years, rather than continuing the normally restless rotations that characterize upward mobility for many civil servants. Both Simon and his boss and mentor, Richard Clarke, worked the terror account for most of the 1990s and thus had a unique ability to connect the dots between the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the East African embassy bombings, and nonstop intelligence warnings through the late 1990s of further attacks to come. Terrorism analysts elsewhere -- whether in the CIA, the State Department, or law enforcement -- are often passing through from other assignments. Lacking the long experience with terrorism that characterized Clarke's unusual tenure at the NSC, others in government did not see the warning signs as clearly as he and his colleagues did.

But a lack of perspective is not the only challenge that Benjamin and Simon document. They describe the bureaucracy's frequent drift to other priorities, tensions between the FBI and the CIA, petty fights over funding new technologies such as the Predator drone, and the desire of State Department regionalists to focus on a more positive agenda, rather than simply terrorism, in dealing with Muslim states. All these tales ring true, and the authors correctly express exasperation at how hard it was to get their jobs done right.

Ultimately, however, theirs is a subjective account and will be matched by those of other players who will want to explain their side of the story, or disagree with this often sharp treatment of the FBI and the media in particular. Other institutions that do not fare well in the Benjamin-Simon rendition include the State Department, the CIA, and the military -- nearly every actor, that is, except for the embattled counterterrorist shop at the NSC.

To be fair, the authors do try to turn the searchlight on themselves as well. They profile Clarke with affection and respect, recognizing his "preternatural gift for spotting emerging issues" and his tenaciousness once on an issue. He was also a master of bureaucratic politics. But when they judge that he sometimes "needlessly alienated people who might have helped him," it reads as a bit of an understatement. I share their view that Clarke and his talented proteges were formidable bureaucratic players and exceedingly hard working and productive. But I am not as sure that the personality problems can be so easily dismissed; many government officials shied away from participating in Clarke's crisis-mode working groups, and others resented his dismissive attitude toward any bureaucratic effort that he was not leading. A more inclusive, consensus-building approach might have helped forge the interagency synergies that the authors found so elusive.