Vietnam, Now: A Reporter Returns; From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War
The contrasting perspectives of these two books dramatically illustrate the problems that Americans have in understanding Vietnam and its culture. Lamb was a combat correspondent during the war, and in 1997 he became the first American reporter to go back to Hanoi. During the subsequent four years he lived and traveled there, he was constantly awed by the qualities of the people he met and struck by how they differed from his negative wartime views. Despite the book's "gee whiz" quality, Lamb also acknowledges the difficulty in reasoning with party officials, who remain ideologically committed. Although he is prepared to accept that foreign businesses have had serious problems operating in Vietnam, Lamb is quick to rationalize the difficulties and overlook the problems of corruption.
Bui Tin, a colonel during the war against the French and a frontline correspondent during the American war, has written an oddly structured but surprisingly effective work. The entire book consists of questions that he poses for himself and then answers, each in only a few paragraphs. In a striking parallel to Lamb, he came to his new understanding of the war after being stationed in Saigon from 1975 to 1979. There, he came to realize that South Vietnam had been on many scores superior to North Vietnam. He then investigates the origins of the war and concludes that Hanoi was ideologically driven by the goal of defending the Soviet bloc and spreading communism. Since the North did not achieve its basic objectives, he concludes, the United States really won the war. He criticizes those Americans who now say the war was "unwinnable," even providing strategic suggestions of what the Americans could have done to militarily defeat Hanoi.
Both authors welcome the thaw in relations between America and Vietnam. Between these two books, former "hawks" and "doves" can find new justifications for their positions.
Related
Eighteen months after its enunciation at Guam the Nixon Doctrine remains obscure and contradictory in its intent and application. It is not simply that the wider pattern of war in Indochina challenges the Doctrine's promise of a lower posture in Asia. More than that, close analysis and the unfolding of events expose some basic flaws in the logic of the Administration's evolving security policy for the new decade. The Nixon Doctrine properly includes more than the declaratory policy orientation. It comprises also the revised worldwide security strategy of "1½ wars" and the new defense decision-making processes such as "fiscal guidance budgeting." These elements have received little comment, especially in their integral relation to our commitments in Asia. But the effects of this Administration's moves in these areas will shape and constrain the choices of the United States for a long time to come.
Let us make two assumptions: first, that the Viet Nam war has reached the beginning of the end and that it will be over within the next year or two; second, that the settlement will involve an American defeat and the extension of communist power to South Viet Nam. Events may falsify both these assumptions, but they may not; it is worth thinking about what the situation will be like if they do not.
The Clinton administration inherits strained bilateral relations with the leading powers of Asia and no coherent policy for the Asia / Pacific region as a whole. Trade, security and diplomatic style are the overarching challenges and on all three counts prominent Asians are worried. They fear a president bent on building trade walls, bringing home American troops and lecturing on human rights. Yet respect for the United States remains instinctive throughout the region, particularly given convincing progress in rejuvenating the American economy. Asia's quest for economic growth and more democratic government awaits leadership from Washington.

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