The Golden Age of the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle, 1972-1989
This conference symposium is far superior to most such works because the editors took seriously their responsibilities; consequently, the contributors have produced well-researched and carefully thought through chapters. In Part I, three authors examine how domestic politics influenced their country's relations with the other two. In the subsequent parts, each of the pairs of relations are treated by authors from the two countries. The period is held up as a "golden age" that began with Richard Nixon's visit to China and ended with the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although no subsequent unifying force has arisen comparable to the Soviet threat, the authors generally seek to find lessons that might still apply to make for better relations among the three powers. In spite of such efforts, the work is better read for its excellent chapters of political and diplomatic history.
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As economic crisis plunges Asia into chaos, old wounds may reopen. The continent still fears Japan, thanks to its World War II brutalities. By refusing to apologize, Tokyo only makes matters worse. A power vacuum results: an unrepentant Japan will never be allowed to lead a suspicious Asia. Instead, flash points may ignite, and East Asia and even America could be dragged into a war. To defuse tensions, America must push its ally to show remorse and Japan must pay its World War II debts. In turn, China and Korea -- age-old enemies of Japan -- must learn to look forward, not back.
Although Japan and China have close economic ties, their diplomatic relations have been strained by clashing interests and cultural friction. The United States has an important role to play in promoting cooperation between Tokyo and Beijing and helping them adjust to a new phase in East Asia's history.
The provisions of the Japanese Constitution barring the resort to war as an instrument of Japanese policy, and effectively committing Japan not to maintain armed forces on a major scale, has long raised the question how Japan's security is to be assured in a world still replete with sources of international conflict. As late as 1948 it was still General MacArthur's view, if the writer of these lines understood him correctly, that it would not be essential for the United States to maintain armed forces on the Japanese archipelago permanently or for a protracted time either for its own security or for that of Japan; in his view, the most suitable status for Japan would be one of permanent demilitarization and neutralization under such general protection as might be afforded by the United Nations and by the friendly interest of the United States. He appeared to believe, as did this writer, that if such a status could be arranged with the concurrence of the Soviet Government, the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Japan would be minimal; and it was not easy to see from what other quarter Japan could be seriously threatened. This concept assumed, of course, an eventual agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States and other interested parties, on the terms of a Japanese peace settlement.

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