Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance; Death of a Generation: How the Assasinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War
Bass addresses a vital transitional period in Washington's Middle East policy. After President Eisenhower's record of astoundingly poor relations with the nationalist Arabs and Israel, President Kennedy sought to strengthen ties with both. The most original part of Bass' book is its account of Kennedy's uneasy courtship of Egypt's Nasser, an attempt to wean him away from the Soviet bloc and soften his uncompromising attitude toward Israel. Some headway was made before Nasser's involvement in Yemen made further progress impossible. The Israeli side of the story is better known. The impact of the 1962 sale of Hawk air defenses to Israel and the concern generated by the Israeli nuclear plant at Dimona have been documented before, but Bass' analysis is well researched, deft, and sensible -- for example, in avoiding exaggeration of the influence of the Jewish lobby. His assessment fits with the more positive image of Kennedy's policymaking that has emerged from recent accounts. Jones' book on Vietnam complements this picture. It is a major piece of scholarship -- of clear value to specialists but possibly a bit dense for the general reader. The account of the events leading up to the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem is particularly good, and the assessment of its dire effect on the nature of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, convincing. Jones is no closer than anyone else to providing a definitive answer to the question of what would have happened had Kennedy lived, but he correctly stresses the extent to which President Johnson was less inclined to disengage.
Related
When the last issue of Foreign Affairs went to press in late August, few readers can have believed that by early fall Egypt and Israel would be negotiating a peace treaty. The only sure way of predicting the future is to have the power to shape it, and here the actors in the field have a great advantage over even the most learned commentators. The army of pundits and experts that marches in the procession of international affairs is becoming very much like the chorus in Greek tragedy, whose vocation was to express musical consternation at events that it was powerless to control.
Throughout 1978 the Middle East was at or near the top of the Carter Administration's foreign policy agenda. For the first time in 30 years an Arab-Israeli peace settlement - at least a partial one - was a practical possibility once President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 had opened the door. As the year began, it was clear that the parties would need mediation and help to reach the promised land of peace and that the United States, the old friend of Israel and new friend of Egypt, was admirably placed to escort them there. The Soviet Union, on bad terms with both Israel and Egypt, was out of the picture. The signs for productive American diplomacy were favorable.
Most Americans approach the problems of the Middle East with a pro-Israeli bias - and rightly so. The desire of a dispersed people for a homeland cannot help but enlist the sympathy even of those with no Jewish roots, nor can any sensitive man or woman fail to be moved by the countless tales of valor and self-sacrifice in the years both preceding and following the creation of Israel. The brave Beauharnais with its desperate human cargo challenging the British destroyers, the poignant sage of the Exodus-47 - these and many similar incidents must recall for all Americans proud chapters from our own earlier history. Set against the grim background of the Holocaust, the story of Israel is a continuing chronicle of grit and enterprise, in which the Entebbe foray is only the most recent footnote. Yet the wonder of it all is that, while engaged in a seemingly endless struggle, the Israelis have managed to turn a desert into a garden.
