Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance; Death of a Generation: How the Assasinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam War
Bass addresses a vital transitional period in Washington's Middle East policy. After President Eisenhower's record of astoundingly poor relations with the nationalist Arabs and Israel, President Kennedy sought to strengthen ties with both. The most original part of Bass' book is its account of Kennedy's uneasy courtship of Egypt's Nasser, an attempt to wean him away from the Soviet bloc and soften his uncompromising attitude toward Israel. Some headway was made before Nasser's involvement in Yemen made further progress impossible. The Israeli side of the story is better known. The impact of the 1962 sale of Hawk air defenses to Israel and the concern generated by the Israeli nuclear plant at Dimona have been documented before, but Bass' analysis is well researched, deft, and sensible -- for example, in avoiding exaggeration of the influence of the Jewish lobby. His assessment fits with the more positive image of Kennedy's policymaking that has emerged from recent accounts. Jones' book on Vietnam complements this picture. It is a major piece of scholarship -- of clear value to specialists but possibly a bit dense for the general reader. The account of the events leading up to the assassination of South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem is particularly good, and the assessment of its dire effect on the nature of the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam, convincing. Jones is no closer than anyone else to providing a definitive answer to the question of what would have happened had Kennedy lived, but he correctly stresses the extent to which President Johnson was less inclined to disengage.
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With the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, the focus in the troubled Middle East has turned to the West Bank, and negotiation of a wider peace settlement. What is rarely discussed in the context of these critical talks is the deterioration of the Israeli economy and the increasing economic pressures on the coalition government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Plagued with the greatest military burden per capita of any country in the world, pushed by its Zionist mission to perpetuate an inefficient state presence in the economy, and dependent upon American assistance for its basic needs, Israel is entering into the most difficult economic phase in its history.
The problem in the Arab-Israeli peace process in late 1985 is not how to arrange a negotiation. The problem is how to make it politically possible--even imperative--for leaders in the conflict to commit themselves to negotiate. Making peace is first a political process, and only second a negotiating process, as the experience of the 1970s taught us. The intense negotiations of that decade, from the shuttle diplomacy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger through the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, followed political steps that had already demonstrated commitment to negotiation and lowered the human and psychological barriers to peace.
The peace treaty ratified by Egypt and Israel on March 29, 1979 is neither an end to a problem nor a fresh point of departure in the efforts to resolve it. Rather, it represents a stage in a protracted series of negotiations, misunderstandings, cajoleries, and tacit agreements extending back for years. All these will continue-but the situation has changed, for Egypt and Israel now have a document with which they can map out their future haggling.

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