Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has pressured every country in the world to make a simple choice: Are you with the United States or with the terrorists? But by casting the choice so starkly--and expanding the war on terror to include its campaign in Iraq--Washington has alienated many natural and potential allies and made the fight against al Qaeda more difficult. It didn't have to be this way. The White House has acted as if it doesn't care what others think, and the country is paying the price for its mistake.
Madeleine K. Albright was U.S. Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001. She is the author of the forthcoming Madam Secretary: A Memoir.
EITHER, OR
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.
There are only two powers now in the world. One is America, which is tyrannical and oppressive. The other is a warrior who has not yet been awakened from his slumber and that warrior is Islam.
Make no mistake about it: the choice for sure is between two visions of the world.
Few readers will fail to identify the first quotation cited above: it was uttered by President George W. Bush, speaking soon after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Few readers, similarly, will be surprised to learn that the second quote came from a Sunni Muslim cleric in Baghdad, Imam Mouaid al-Ubaidi. The third quote, however, may be a bit harder to identify: it was spoken by French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, describing the different world views now held by Washington and Paris. And it should remind us that not everyone divides the world along the same lines as the United States.
Framing choices is central to national security policy. Since World War II, no nation has played a more influential role in defining such alternatives than the United States. Today, however, the Bush administration purports to be redefining the fundamental choice "every nation, in every region" must make. America's radical adversaries -- eager to promote themselves as the United States' chief nemeses -- are echoing the attempt. Those caught in the middle, however, suggest the choices before them may not be quite so simple.
For President Bush, September 11 came as a revelation, leading him to the startled conclusion that the globe had changed in ways gravely hazardous to the security -- indeed, the very survival -- of the United States. This conclusion soon led Bush to a fateful decision: to depart, in fundamental ways, from the approach that has characterized U.S. foreign policy for more than half a century. Soon, reliance on alliance had been replaced by redemption through preemption; the shock of force trumped the hard work of diplomacy, and long-time relationships were redefined.
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How will the United States defend itself against the unknown, the unseen, and the unexpected? One way is by exploiting new technologies to develop a flexible arsenal: reduced nuclear forces, advanced conventional capabilities, and a range of defenses against missile, space, and computer attacks. Yet all the high-tech weapons in the world will not defend the country unless the Pentagon and the armed forces change the way they train, fight, and think. Americans and their military must accept changing coalitions, understand the need for preemptive offense, and prepare for a new kind of war that may increasingly be waged with nonmilitary means. Now is precisely the time to begin making these changes; September 11 is all the proof we need.
Pundits claim that U.S. foreign policy is too focused on unilateral preemption. But George W. Bush's vision -- enshrined in his 2002 National Security Strategy -- is far broader and deeper than that. The president has promoted bold and effective policies to combat terrorism, intervened decisively to prevent regional conflicts, and embraced other major powers such as Russia, China, and India. Above all, he has committed the United States to a strategy of partnerships, which affirms the vital role of international alliances while advancing American interests and principles.
Taken together, Peter Beinart's The Good fight and Joe Klein's Politics Lost provide a road map for a successful, politically savvy Democratic foreign policy.

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