Giants and Pygmies
"The American way of war" refers to the grinding strategy of attrition that U.S. generals traditionally employed to prevail in combat. But that was then. Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the new American way of war relies on speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. This approach was put on display in the invasion of Iraq and should reshape what the military looks like.
GIANTS AND PYGMIES
To the Editor:
America may have contrived a new way of war, as Max Boot argues ("The New American Way of War," July/August 2003), but the recent victory in Iraq hardly demonstrates its potency. Iraq fought a debilitating war with Iran in the 1980s, lost decisively in the Gulf War of 1991, and endured international sanctions and occasional U.S.-British bombardments for more than a decade. Iraq entered its most recent war with its military strength at less than half of its 1991 level. Why then does Boot find it impressive that the United States and the United Kingdom won with about half the troops, in about half the time, and with about half the casualties of the first Gulf War?
In 2001, Iraq's GDP was about $15 billion, and its defense expenditure $1.5 billion. U.S. GDP was about $10.2 trillion, and its defense expenditure $322 billion. For a giant to defeat a pygmy hardly tests a country's military prowess or validates a "new way of war."
Kenneth N. Waltz
Columbia University
Related
The Bush administration's new national security strategy gets much right but may turn out to be myopic. The world has changed in ways that make it impossible for the most dominant power since Rome to go it alone. U.S. policymakers must realize that power today lies not only in the might of one's sword but in the appeal of one's ideas.
"The American way of war" refers to the grinding strategy of attrition that U.S. generals traditionally employed to prevail in combat. But that was then. Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the new American way of war relies on speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. This approach was put on display in the invasion of Iraq and should reshape what the military looks like.
Two postmortems on the Iraq occupation lambaste Washington for handling the job poorly. But doing much better would be so difficult that perhaps the bar should be raised for going to war in the first place.
