Ever since World War II, the slightest sign of nationalism in Japan has been widely denounced, at home and abroad. Recently, however, discussions that were once taboo -- including whether to rearm or even develop nuclear weapons -- have moved into the Japanese mainstream. Yet the country's critics need not be alarmed; a little healthy nationalism may be just what Japan, with its faltering economy, needs most.
Eugene A. Matthews, a former Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, is President of Nintai, an international educational firm.
ARMED AND DANGEROUS?
On December 18, 2001, the Japanese navy detected an unidentified ship sliding through the country's territorial waters off the Amami Islands, in the East China Sea. The vessel, a 100-ton squid fishing ship, bore Chinese markings. Something about its design seemed unusual, however, and no fishing equipment was visible. Japanese officials grew suspicious and decided to investigate.
The mystery ship did not respond to hails and fired on Japanese ships when they approached. In response, the Japanese decided to give chase. After an extended pursuit deep into Chinese waters, Japanese patrol boats opened fire on the intruder with heavy machine guns. The fleeing craft -- which turned out to be a North Korean spy ship, bearing no fishing equipment of any kind -- caught fire and sank, killing its Korean crew.
Apart from a few newspaper reports, the episode got little attention in the West. But the significance of Japan's uncharacteristically assertive response -- a marked contrast to past incursions, and the first time Japan's navy had sunk a foreign vessel since the end of World War II -- was not lost on local observers. Such behavior, they noted, would have been almost unimaginable only a decade ago. The fact that Tokyo was suddenly willing to use force suggested a major shift in the attitudes of the Japanese about their country and its defense.
This shift became much clearer a year later, when, in October 2002, North Korea admitted that it was actively developing nuclear weapons (and, a month later, insisted that it already possessed a few working bombs). In mid-February 2003, Japan's defense minister, Shigeru Ishiba, warned North Korea that Japan could launch a preemptive strike to defend itself if necessary. He repeated the warning on September 15 while in London, noting that "the Japanese constitution permits my position. Attacking North Korea after a missile attack on Japan is too late." Other prominent members of Japan's government and media have followed suit, arguing that their country should prepare to defend itself -- including, possibly, by developing nuclear weapons.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Christendom, Europe, or, more broadly, the Western world is customarily balanced with the Orient, the East, or more narrowly, Asia. This equation, however, is a false one. While the various lands of the West do in fact share a common historical tradition and in many cases similar cultural traits, Asia is divided into major cultural traditions as far removed from one another as from the West. There are vast psychological and cultural gulfs between the Arabic-Islamic world of West Asia and North Africa, the Hindu-Buddhist civilization of India and Southeast Asia, and the Sinic world of East Asia. But within each of these major cultural units there do exist psychological and cultural bonds in some ways comparable to those that unite the countries of the West. This article explores the nature and strength of these bonds among the countries of East Asia-that is, China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam-and the degree to which these affect their present political and strategic relations with one another and with countries outside this cultural grouping.
Over four hundred years ago, the first Occidentals to come to Japan, the Portuguese, wrote letters home stating that the Japanese were different from other Asians and Africans and more like Europeans than any people yet discovered. Visitors from Europe and the Americas are still writing the same kind of letters, but whether the Japanese are really more like Europeans is open to question.
Over the past century the politics of East Asia have been influenced more profoundly by the Sino-Japanese relationship than by any other single factor. Because both the two present-day societies have roots in classical Chinese civilization-only a "heritage" for each today-Chinese and Japanese politicians before World War II often argued that there was a special binding relationship between them. Japan's written language and much of its religious, artistic and moral civilization derive from Chinese culture, while Japan was the primary influence both positively and negatively on whole generations of Chinese revolutionaries, some of whom are still alive and active today. Perhaps because of this common heritage of civilization and mutual influence, the enormous misunderstandings, wars, threats and depredations that have characterized Sino-Japanese relations for a century have tended to take on the ferocity of a family or civil feud. Even though well-educated Chinese and Japanese can learn each other's language rather easily, it is doubtful whether any two peoples in the twentieth century have approached each other with more profoundly misleading stereotypes.
