Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation
In most discussions of nuclear policy, it is enough to know that exploding weapons cause unimaginably horrific damage over an extended area. In this exhaustive study of a problem that the author herself calls "undeniably weird," however, Eden wants to know why damage assessments focus so much on the effects of blast that they underestimate the damage of the firestorms that result (and thus underestimate the total impact of a nuclear explosion). The standard answer is that the effects of the latter are much harder to calculate. But Eden, after finding analysts who can make such calculations, instead attributes it to the way the Pentagon has framed the issue -- focusing on the elimination of specific targets rather than on the totality of death and destruction. This investigation leads Eden into the more arcane and unsettling aspects of nuclear planning, and students of this area will find in her book much fascinating detail. More broadly, however, she seeks to demonstrate how institutional knowledge often leaves out critical facts -- leading to disaster when incomplete information becomes the basis for action.
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The reelection of Ronald Reagan makes the future of his Strategic Defense Initiative the most important question of nuclear arms competition and arms control on the national agenda since 1972. The President is strongly committed to this program, and senior officials, including Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, have made it clear that he plans to intensify this effort in his second term. Sharing the gravest reservations about this undertaking, and believing that unless it is radically constrained during the next four years it will bring vast new costs and dangers to our country and to mankind, we think it urgent to offer an assessment of the nature and hazards of this initiative, to call for the closest vigilance by Congress and the public, and even to invite the victorious President to reconsider. While we write only after obtaining the best technical advice we could find, our central concerns are political. We believe the President_s initiative to be a classic case of good intentions that will have bad results because they do not respect reality.
Toward the end of what almost immediately came to be called his "Star Wars" speech in March of 1983, President Reagan concluded an impassioned defense of his arms budget by proposing that American scientists begin research on a very advanced system that could protect the West from ballistic missile attack by the turn of the century or soon thereafter.
On March 23, 1983, President Reagan delivered a televised speech to the nation in which he initiated a potentially radical departure in U.S. strategic policy. The President suggested that the policy of nuclear deterrence through the threat of strategic nuclear retaliation is inadequate, and called upon the vast American technological community to examine the potential for effective defense against ballistic missiles.

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