Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961
With young scholars now digging into the archives, we are discovering how little we knew of the complexities of Soviet relations with its puppets and proxies. Harrison has turned over every archival rock in reconstructing the tense relationship between the Soviet Union and Walter Ulbricht's East Germany, from Stalin's death until the construction of the Berlin Wall. She does not ultimately argue that the tail was wagging the dog; Moscow, not Berlin, instigated the Berlin crises. But her very careful account does show how much Nikita Khrushchev and Ulbricht disagreed on virtually every issue, from domestic policy in the German Democratic Republic to Soviet economic aid, East German sovereignty, and confronting the West. Harrison is not alone in teaching us that third parties played a significant role in shaping the Cold War, but hers is a particularly striking example.
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German reunification ranks high on George Bush's impressive list of foreign policy achievements. Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice's engaging account reveals how American leadership won the day.
Early on August 22, 1939, the world was startled to learn from an announcement in the Soviet press that German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop would arrive in Moscow on the following day to sign a nonaggression pact. Equipped with instructions from Adolf Hitler authorizing him to sign both a treaty and a secret protocol that would enter into force as soon as signed by the two countries (rather than when ratified later), Ribbentrop left for Moscow that evening. At the airport, the German delegation was met by deputy commissar for foreign affairs, Vladimir P. Potemkin, who earlier that year had declined an invitation to meet with British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax.
The recent emergence of nationalist and populist forces in eastern Europe, coupled with the rise of Russia, now threatens to derail efforts toward further EU integration, weaken NATO, erode the continent's stability, and damage U.S. interests. Washington must ensure that the region's new politics do not damage the European project, for a strong and cohesive EU is in everyone's interest.
