Power and Purpose: U.S. Policy Toward Russia After the Cold War
This is the first book to explore U.S. policy toward Russia from Bush to Bush, and to do so with both a sophisticated conceptual framework and inside information. Goldgeier and McFaul do not try to explore every dimension or every major issue in U.S.-Russian relations. Rather, they focus on the core challenge of aiding Russia's domestic transformation and promoting its constructive integration into a changing international system. Thus, the analytical interplay is between the contrasting ways Republican and Democratic administrations approached this challenge, on the one hand, and the different weights they attached to security concerns versus support for Russian economic and political reform, on the other. The subtlety, balance, and insight of the analysis gives the book weight; the wealth of highly revealing material, gathered from interviews with a wide range of officials from the first Bush and Clinton administrations, gives it depth.
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Although Russia has projected itself more forcefully on the world stage since the beginning of the Putin era, its foreign policy still lacks any sort of grand strategic vision. Russian leaders continue to squabble over issues from NATO expansion to the world economy. But they are particularly concerned about Russia's identity, especially with regard to the post-Soviet states. If the Bush administration fails to devise a coherent policy of its own toward its former rival, it may face serious problems down the road.
The dance symbolizes the over-militarization of the superpowers, leading to stagnation in the USSR and undermining the USA economically. Notes some political constraints (demonstrated by the dismissal of Yeltsin) on Gorbachev's domestic programme, as well as his conduct of foreign affairs. By 1987, Reagan faced 'new thinking' on the part of the USSR, a Democrat-controlled Senate and the Iran-Contra affair, as well as economic problems, a major cause of which has been military expenditures. These trends led to a cautious improvement in superpower relations in 1987.
Moscow with a Soviet hangover tests the patience even of those who most wish to engage it. As Chechnya festers, privatization lags, and the world contemplates the possibility of a communist president in the Kremlin dreaming of empire, some ridicule the notion of partnership. Russian chauvinists paint America as the enemy, but the interests of the two countries after the Cold War are compatible. The West should focus its attention--and Russia's--on common interests like nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, regional peace, and full participati0n in the world economy. America should deal rationally with irrationalities in a nation finding its way.
