Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel
Admirers of the late Michael Handel will welcome this short volume of essays, one of three produced as a tribute. It addresses one of Handel's favorite topics: how countries can manage their intelligence to avoid getting caught by surprise. In addition to his own essay on the subject, there are contributions by a number of top specialists, including Richard Betts' discussion of the politicization of intelligence and John Ferris' detailed assessment of British military deception in the two world wars. Handel died in June 2001, a few months before that September's catastrophic surprise. As James Wirtz notes, the fact that the United States might have seen the attack coming would have confirmed Handel's skepticism of the possibility of developing an operational theory of surprise. These essays similarly conclude that there are inherent difficulties in trying to guard against surprise, although there are approaches to intelligence collection that can reduce its likelihood.
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The United States may be an uncontested military superpower, but it remains defenseless against a new mode of attack: information warfare. As the military, the private sector, and Washington grow increasingly dependent on computers and information networks, they also grow more vulnerable to cyber-attack. Cyberspace is becoming the new front line of warfare, and private citizens are the new prime target. U.S. policymakers and technology entrepreneurs must wake up to this threat and build a wall of defense -- now.
The failure to prevent the September 11, 2001, attacks or find Iraqi WMD have put intelligence at the center of this year's presidential campaign. The key to better performance, however, lies not in major reforms but in the character and sense of responsible officials.
The Greater Good
HANS-GEORG WIECK
In his essay reviewing James Critchfield's book Partners at the Creation ("Berlin to Baghdad," July/August 2004), Timothy Naftali devalues and disparages the early postwar cooperation between the CIA and what later became West Germany's Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), its federal intelligence service. Naftali asserts that the intelligence delivered by General Reinhard Gehlen's organization and its successor, the BND, was "of no significance" and of "questionable" value.
