Allies: The U.S., Britain, and Europe in the Aftermath of the Iraq War; Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance
These two short books by veteran journalists describe the deep divisions that emerged within the Western alliance over the war in Iraq. Together, the books also embody those divisions: in their contrasting explanations of what went wrong and who is to blame.
Shawcross, a British liberal who has long taken strong moral stands on foreign policy issues, leaves no doubt where he stands: George W. Bush, Tony Blair, and their coalition allies launched a just and necessary war to remove an evil dictator, and those who opposed their efforts were "friends of Saddam" who failed to understand how the world changed on September 11. Shawcross writes compellingly of Saddam Hussein's murderous history and accurately describes the erosion of U.S.-led efforts to "contain" Iraq (not least because of French and Russian unwillingness to support them). He provides an insightful account of the "neoconservatives" who built the intellectual case for war; he also shares their favorite hobbyhorses and polemical style: weak-willed Continentals have little to offer the powerful United States; not attacking Iraq would have been akin to ignoring al Qaeda in 2001 or Germany in 1936; and the only possible explanations for French and German opposition to the war are commercial interests, corruption, and anti-Americanism. The hyperbole sometimes detracts from an otherwise powerful defense of the war.
Pond's book is more descriptive than normative, but her tone makes clear that she has a different view. Impatient with the neoconservatives that Shawcross admires, she worries that Washington's arrogance and unilateralism will destroy the transatlantic alliance. Pond, an American based in Berlin, is also far less suspicious of French and German motives. The transatlantic split over whether to invade Iraq is over; the debate over the causes and consequences of that split has just begun.
Related
Only a few years ago pundits were sure that the United States was losing to Asia and Europe and had to emulate their more state- directed economies to remain competitive. Now the conventional wisdom is that America is number one and that the rest of the world should adopt its more laissez-faire approach. In fact, neither caricature is right. Asia was booming and now it is slumping, but it will be back. Europe's underlying ossification will persist. But most important, while the U.S. economy is in a period of robust growth, nothing fundamental has changed. Its long-run growth rate has not accelerated, productivity has not risen, and the structural unemployment rate has fallen by one percentage point at most. Come the next recession, all this triumphalism will seem silly.
A European Security Conference (ESC) will almost certainly take place in 1973. It will convene with active, if reluctant, American participation. This unfortunate reluctance is especially pronounced in Washington. The United States now has not only an opportunity but a responsibility to lead the Western nations in a search for a new system in Europe. In view of the inevitability of the conference, it would be especially short-sighted to forsake the dynamic and innovative role we could play. Unhappily, I see no signs, at least from a vantage point on Capitol Hill, that the United States will enter this decisive stage with any policy ideas which might wrest the initiative from the East. The Western impetus for a constructive conference comes almost entirely from some of our NATO allies, whose cautious enthusiasm is under a steady restraint from the Washington flagship of the Atlantic Alliance.
Richard Holbrooke's gripping memoir shows how he improvised a makeshift peace in what was left of Bosnia despite a timorous Pentagon, a reluctant president, waweirding allies, and brutal ethnic cleansers. But the Dayton Accord came too late.
