Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars
Although the Balkan wars of the 1990s were homegrown, diasporas from Australia to North America played more than a cameo role. Hockenos is the first person with enough curiosity and drive to unravel systematically the connections between the Croat, Serb, and Albanian emigre populations and Franjo Tudjman, Slobodan Milosevic, and others who presided over the Balkan calamity. He carefully stresses that Croat, Serb, and Albanian diaspora communities are immensely varied and that only a radical fringe of emotional right-wing nationalists is the target of his sleuthing. But these were the people who mattered, and for the worse. Gojko Susak, a Canadian businessman, returned to fill a key ministerial post in Tudjman's regime, and Radmila Milantijevic, a professor and dean at the City University of New York, served as Milosevic's loyal spokesperson. No less important, an array of murky groups provided money, arms, and well-heeled public-relations support.
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Europeans enter the 1980s experiencing, for the first time since the cold war, a deep sense of concern--and even fear in some quarters--for the preservation of peace on their Continent. The decade began with speeches by European leaders, including President Giscard d'Estaing and Pope John Paul II, stressing the risks of a new world war, and polls conducted in several European countries throughout 1980 echoed similar qualms.
In our nuclear age, questions of defense planning-once a fairly simple matter of estimating the amounts expended by the various nations, totting up numbers of mobilizable men, evaluating weapons (as in Janes Fighting Ships), appreciating the contributions of allies and so on-have passed into a surrealistic sphere of bluff, counterbluff, nightmare and potential extinction of the human race. Reassuringly, neither of the superpowers, even when one held a monopoly or a vast preponderance of nuclear power, has so far been willing to use, or to threaten the use of, the superweapon in pursuit of its political aims-even (as in Vietnam) against a tiny nonnuclear adversary. (Khrushchev's empty threat at the time of Suez was the exception that proves the rule.) Indeed, its possession has so far simply resulted in a perpetuation of the political status quo. Any negotiated arrangement between the superpowers on the limitation or even reduction of their nuclear panoply will also, most likely, only be possible on such a basis.

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