Sun Blind?
Ever since World War II, the slightest sign of nationalism in Japan has been widely denounced, at home and abroad. Recently, however, discussions that were once taboo -- including whether to rearm or even develop nuclear weapons -- have moved into the Japanese mainstream. Yet the country's critics need not be alarmed; a little healthy nationalism may be just what Japan, with its faltering economy, needs most.
To the Editor:
In "Japan's New Nationalism" (November/December 2003), Eugene A. Matthews calls for U.S. leaders to temper Japan's moves to create a higher-profile military, because of the threat to other states in East Asia, particularly China. Yet so far, the silence from these countries has been deafening. Save for the occasional complaint from North Korea, few have expressed disquiet over Japan's recent militaristic moves, such as its recent decision to dispatch troops to Iraq and its declared intention to build a ballistic-missile shield.
Could Beijing's seeming indifference be tacit approval for Japan's military rise? As Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel elucidate in the same issue of Foreign Affairs ("China's New Diplomacy"), China is developing a more sophisticated foreign policy. Beijing may, in fact, recognize that Tokyo's approach to its modern security interests makes sense, given Japan's global stature and the growing threat to the region posed by North Korea. China may also realize that, although Japan appears to be slightly more comfortable with a greater military role, its electorate is unlikely to allow the fiercely nationalistic Japanese soldier to reappear any time soon.
Richard Marshall
Honolulu, Hawaii
Related
Christendom, Europe, or, more broadly, the Western world is customarily balanced with the Orient, the East, or more narrowly, Asia. This equation, however, is a false one. While the various lands of the West do in fact share a common historical tradition and in many cases similar cultural traits, Asia is divided into major cultural traditions as far removed from one another as from the West. There are vast psychological and cultural gulfs between the Arabic-Islamic world of West Asia and North Africa, the Hindu-Buddhist civilization of India and Southeast Asia, and the Sinic world of East Asia. But within each of these major cultural units there do exist psychological and cultural bonds in some ways comparable to those that unite the countries of the West. This article explores the nature and strength of these bonds among the countries of East Asia-that is, China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam-and the degree to which these affect their present political and strategic relations with one another and with countries outside this cultural grouping.
The major events of 1983 in East Asian politics and economics can be looked at from three broad vantage points or planes of abstraction. At the most general level one sees, rather like the movements of tectonic plates on the earth's surface, a slight shift in the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy from Europe toward Asia. In large part this shift is prompted by a growing realization among the leaders of the United States and Japan that their nations will, for the indefinite future, be paramount in the fundamental sciences and their practical offshoots in microelectronics, biotechnology, fine ceramics, and other new areas of technical development, and that Western Europe will trail in most of these fields and the Soviet Union simply be left behind. The fact that the American President met with the prime minister of Japan three times during 1983 underscores this trend, as did the President's statement in Tokyo in November that "No relationship between any two countries is more important to world peace and prosperity than the relationship between the United States and Japan."
THE defeat of Japan in 1945 brought with it a wave of decolonization throughout East Asia. To an extent few in the West had realized, the Japanese humiliation of the white man in 1941 and 1942-together with worldwide currents at work in India and elsewhere-had prepared the way for the rapid end of colonial rule. In this process, the Philippines had only to grasp the independence already promised before the war by the United States; the same promise had been made to India under the pressure of the war, and its early realization under Lord Mountbatten and a Labour government contributed to the rapid grant of independence to Burma and the extension of believed assurances for the ultimate independence of Malaya and Singapore. Only the Netherlands East Indies-already styled by its nationalists the Republic of Indonesia-and French Indochina stood out from the first as deeply contested cases, where the colonial power was not ready to yield and where powerful nationalist movements were at work.
