Understanding Saddam
The failure to prevent the September 11, 2001, attacks or find Iraqi WMD have put intelligence at the center of this year's presidential campaign. The key to better performance, however, lies not in major reforms but in the character and sense of responsible officials.
To the Editor:
In "The New Politics of Intelligence" (May/June 2004), Richard K. Betts argues that "Saddam's record in obstructing un inspectors and lying throughout the cat-and-mouse inspection game of the 1990s made no apparent sense unless the Iraqis were continuing to hide the weapons." This misses the fact that the security system for Iraq's weaponry and that for Saddam's personal safety were the same. Saddam saw the inspections, at least in part, as something the United States could use to calculate his whereabouts, thus making an assassination by, say, a cruise missile entirely feasible. Consequently, his wariness and duplicity -- especially when inspectors demanded to visit such sensitive places as his palaces and Baath Party headquarters -- are quite understandable.
JOHN MUELLER
Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Policy and Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University
Related
During the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, writes the intelligence community's former senior analyst for the Middle East, the Bush administration disregarded the community's expertise, politicized the intelligence process, and selected unrepresentative raw intelligence to make its public case.
President Bush's case for war on Iraq overlooks a very real danger: if pushed to the wall, Saddam Hussein may resort to using weapons of mass destruction against the United States. Such a strike may not be likely, or may not succeed, but attacking Saddam is the best way to guarantee that it will happen. And Washington has done far too little to prepare for it.
The periodic successes enjoyed by US cryptanalysts in breaking the Japanese PURPLE code could have made no contribution to advance warning of the Japanese attack, as PURPLE was used strictly for diplomatic, not military, communications. The attack was a deep shock to US intelligence, and "has taught the United States to gather more information and evaluate it better".

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