The Iraq War
Keegan-not so much a journalist as a military historian who happens to work for a newspaper-has written an account of the Iraq war that benefits from a long historical prologue (which includes discussion of the post-World War I British attempt to pacify Iraq) and his skill at capturing the dynamics of a military campaign. Keegan, however, must now wish that he had waited to complete the book, as events have conspired to put the war, which he describes in a positive and even partisan tone, in a more dismal light. The postwar scene gets cursory treatment, under the heading of "The Aftermath," and this is the story now waiting to be told. More than the campaign itself, it is the diplomatic isolation during the build-up and the incompetence and trauma of the occupation that may define a turning point in U.S. foreign policy-and the end of the Vulcans' rise.
Related
Because they lack a coherent strategy, U.S. forces in Iraq have failed to defeat the insurgency or improve security. Winning will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting down insurgents. And it will take at least a decade.
As the recent fiasco with body scanners at airports demonstrated, the United States' homeland security strategy is off track. It has failed to harness two vital assets: civil society and the private sector. Washington should promote a sensible preparedness among individuals, communities, and corporations.
This article appears in the Foreign Affairs eBook, "The U.S. vs. al Qaeda: A History of the War on Terror." Now available for purchase.
A new history of the United States' pre-September 11 efforts to combat terrorism portrays them as marked by myopia, indecision, and diffidence.

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