Deterrence
Lawrence Freedman's prolific career has produced major works on many important national security issues, especially nuclear strategy. He remains one of the rare leading academics whose work is intelligible to normal people. In a snappy commentary that builds on his store of wisdom, Deterrence surveys and updates the status of the most fundamental strategic concept of the past half-century, the be all and end all of strategy in a Cold War world of bipolarity and mutual vulnerability and also a buzzword used to rationalize any and all security policies.
In today's unipolar world, where the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been trashed and threats of highest priority seem to come from fanatics who cannot be restrained by fear, the concept of deterrence has fallen from grace. The Bush administration has replaced it with preventive war as prime guidance for strategy. Drawing on fields of knowledge apart from nuclear strategy (criminology, for example), Freedman considers the evolution of thinking about deterrence, the limitations of the idea as a basis for policy, and its continuing relevance in the post-Cold War world. As usual, he provides a wealth of sensible observations. He departs from the traditional focus of deterrence on strategic means, however, when he argues that "what we need to think about is not so much how to make deterrence work, but about what sorts of behavior we now wish to proscribe" and that the main objective now "has to be to encourage the development of an international order in which there are formidable restraints on the use of force." This hints at one question on which Freedman does not concentrate but which has become urgent for much of the world: What can deter the United States?
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The risk of a catastrophic exchange of nuclear missiles has receded. Yet the chances of some use of weapons of mass destruction have risen. Chemical weapons are a lesser threat, but more likely. A vial of anthrax dispersed over Washington could kill as many as three million. Traditional deterrence will not stop a disgruntled group with no identifiable address from striking out at America. The United States must pull back from excessive foreign involvements and begin a program of civil defense to reduce casualties in the event the unthinkable happens.
Because they lack a coherent strategy, U.S. forces in Iraq have failed to defeat the insurgency or improve security. Winning will require a new approach to counterinsurgency, one that focuses on providing security to Iraqis rather than hunting down insurgents. And it will take at least a decade.
It can, but only if U.S. officials start to think clearly about what success in the war on terror would actually look like. Victory will come only when Washington succeeds in discrediting the terrorists' ideology and undermining their support. These achievements, in turn, will require accepting that the terrorist threat can never be eradicated completely and that acting as though it can will only make it worse.
