Last year's crisis in Caracas caught Washington by surprise, causing oil prices to skyrocket and exposing flaws in the U.S. ability to forecast and cope with threats to its oil supply. Both government and industry must do better next time.
Michelle Billig was a 2003-4 International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1999 to 2003 she worked in the U.S. Department of Energy.
In June 2004, the price of oil reached $42.33 a barrel-the highest point ever in 21 years of trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange-pushing average U.S. gasoline prices to more than $2 per gallon. The surge had numerous causes, including market speculation, shortfalls in the U.S. capacity for refining crude oil, higher Chinese demand, and insecurity in the Middle East. The root of the crisis, however, lay closer to home: in Venezuela, where a general strike in late 2002 and early 2003 had severely constricted the flow of oil and gasoline for several months.
For the first time, the U.S. oil supply was significantly disrupted by strife in a region other than the Middle East. The Venezuelan strike was also the first disruption not caused by a war, revolution, or embargo, but rather by a slow, debilitating political standoff. It came at a particularly bad time for the United States, combining with civil unrest in Nigeria and the U.S. invasion of Iraq several months later. And it highlighted the challenges Washington faces in responding to new threats to its oil supply.
Of course, the U.S. management of the crisis in Venezuela could have been significantly better. Distracted by the Iraq debate and planning for the war, U.S. officials did not focus sufficiently on events in Venezuela prior to the strike. When they did take note, both Washington and the oil industry misread Venezuela's political situation and underestimated the impact the showdown there would have on the flow of oil. Had an early warning system and response strategy been in place, Washington could have ensured that the oil market was better supplied to weather the uncertainty. The Venezuelan crisis should thus serve as a warning: more disruptions in the U.S. oil supply are likely, and unless serious efforts are made to improve Washington's analysis and response mechanisms, the system will continue to fail.
A SHIFT TO INSTABILITY
The world oil market-and Washington's relationship to it-has changed dramatically since 1991, the year of the last major oil disruption (caused by the Persian Gulf War). For one thing, the United States is now more dependent on oil imports than ever before. In 1950, it imported just one-tenth of its oil supplies. By 1973, the share of imported oil had grown to one-third. Today, the United States gets nearly two-thirds of its petroleum from abroad.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
Chinese foreign policy is now driven by China's unprecendented need for resources. In exchange for access to oil and other raw materials to fuel its booming economy, Beijing has boosted its bilateral relations with resource-rich states, sometimes striking deals with rogue governments or treading on U.S. turf. Beijing's hunger may worry some in Washington, but it also creates new grounds for cooperation.
As oil flirts with prices that call to mind the shocks of the 1970s, the usual Cassandras have been warning of dwindling oil supplies and sky-high prices. But the danger is precisely the opposite. The next two decades will witness a prolonged surplus of oil, which will tamp prices down. This world of cheap oil will have serious political reverberations. Without rising oil revenues, such key states as Saudi Arabia, Russia, Mexico, and Colombia will face worsening crises at home. The same is true in spades for Central Asia, where Washington's current wrongheaded policies could drag it into crises that make the Balkans look like a pregame warm-up. The world should worry less about a scarcity of oil than about a glut.
Russia and the United States have settled on oil as the basis of a new partnership. This move is dangerous, however, because it ignores the divergent interests of the two countries and their inability to influence global oil markets. Indeed, war in Iraq could tear this partnership apart. A far better basis for U.S. - Russian ties would be the two nations' durable common interest in developing and safeguarding nuclear power.
