Beyond headlines dominated by terrorist cells and separatist insurgencies, the world's largest majority-Muslim country has undergone a profound transformation in recent years. Reformers have quietly but brilliantly overhauled the country's long-intractable political system. The government that takes office in October will be the people's choice more than ever before-and will have an unprecedented opportunity to set Indonesia on the road to good governance and economic prosperity.
Lex Rieffel is a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution.
WRONG IMPRESSION
For the past few years, most news reports from Indonesia have featured terrorists, regional insurgencies, and human rights violations. They portray a government that is dealing ineffectively with these problems and an economy that is falling further behind its Asian neighbors. Developments beneath the surface, however, lead to a more hopeful view: Indonesia-the world's fourth most populous country and the largest by far with a Muslim majority-is undergoing a profound political transition. Over the past five years, its democratic system has been overhauled quietly but brilliantly, and the foundations for a better system of governance have been put in place. The government that takes office on October 20 will be the people's choice more than ever before.
Indonesia's democratic transformation, known as Reformasi, began in 1998. In the wake of ten years of flamboyant dictatorship under President Sukarno and more than three decades of iron rule by President Suharto, the country's political institutions were weak. Reformasi may have been more of an elite coup than a people's revolution, but its objective was to find a viable path to a just and prosperous society. In 1999, a new national parliament was chosen in the first openly contested elections since 1955, and Abdurrahman Wahid became president through an indirect vote. In mid-2001, Wahid was forced out of office due to his erratic leadership, and Megawati Sukarnoputri-Sukarno's eldest daughter-ascended to the presidency.
The results of a national election last April 5 showed just how profound an effect Reformasi has had on Indonesia's political system. Going into the election, President Megawati had all the advantages of incumbency, but the outcome reflected broad disappointment in her leadership. Her party-the secular nationalist PDI-P-won less than 20 percent of the popular vote for the 550-seat national parliament, down from 34 percent in 1999. Golkar-the centrist bureaucratic party nurtured by Suharto-came out on top, finishing with the most seats in parliament, although its share of the vote had fallen slightly since 1999. The poor showing of these two leading parties especially benefited the secular, progressive Democratic Party (PD), led by former general Susilo Bambang Yudhyono, and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), an urban-based Islamic party campaigning on a platform emphasizing clean government.
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Every historical milestone reflects the end as well as the beginning of an era, and since history is continuity in spite of change, so the beginning of an era is never a complete disengagement from the past, either materially or mentally. Such is the case now in Indonesia.
Into his fourth decade in power, President Suharto has guided an impoverished, strife-ridden nation to rising prosperity and outward stability, at the cost of abridged political and civil liberties, gutted democratic institutions, and flourishing corruption. Now economic disparities, ethnic and religious differences, and the frustrated aspirations of a new generation are triggering outbreaks of violence across the islands, and what passes for politics in Indonesia is unable to cope. The unsettled succession to Suharto, 76, is, frankly, scary.
Did East Timor's departure start the dominoes tumbling? Will this vast, multiethnic archipelago fall apart? Not likely. A hard look at Indonesia's main candidates for secession reveals that they have little in common with East Timor and even less with each other. The provinces remain Jakarta's to lose. If the capital plays its cards right, curbs the army's abuses, and accommodates legitimate local goals, the center will indeed hold.
