Leo Strauss and the Politics of American Empire
The subject of the German-born philosopher Leo Strauss (and the influence he had on his disciples, many of whom became either conservative political theorists or neoconservative policymakers and writers) is an intriguing one. So far, it has been treated rather superficially. Norton, a political theorist who studied with Straussians, has written a disorderly book, studded with anecdotes, narrative leaps, and a mix of gossip and erudite analysis, that left this reader exhausted, irritated, and more than a bit saddened by the opportunity lost. Norton knows how to hit a target-her critique of Allan Bloom's Closing of the American Mind, which "takes the language of anti-Semitism ... and turns it from the Jews to the Blacks," is excellent-but the first half of the book will interest only those titillated by academic chitchat. Her brief discussion of the criticisms of modernity offered by Strauss and his disciples, Hannah Arendt, and the Egyptian thinker Sayyid Qutb is provocative, as is her detour into the Straussian cult of Winston Churchill. In her chapters on the war on terrorism, she is right to stress that neoconservatism is "a radical departure from traditional conservatism," but she subsequently returns to digressions and thumbnail sketches. Intelligent asides do not amount to a satisfactory book.
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Nineteen eighty-four has been a quiet year in U.S.-West European relations--a year during which these Western countries had the luxury of organizing a large number of conferences for intellectuals and public figures to ask themselves whether George Orwell's bleak warnings had actually been prophetic (if they had been, these colloquia could not have been held) and whether Soviet reality resembled Orwell's vision of totalitarianism. What actually happened in the relations among these nations was less interesting than what did not happen.
At the end of 1964, a cycle of American-European argument which had opened some seven years earlier came to a close when President Johnson decided to abandon American pressure for an immediate resolution of the negotiations regarding a multilateral nuclear force. Since then the common assumption has been that there is to be a nine-month lull, until after the German elections in September, before the next phase of the dialogue on the future scope and nature of the Atlantic Alliance is resumed, even though any successful outcome to it may have to wait until the attitudes and policy of post-de Gaulle France are clear.
The differences that arise more or less regularly between the nations bordering the two sides of the North Atlantic are customarily laid to "misunderstandings." But the fact that these differences multiplied all through 1980 indicates that there exists between the United States and two of its principal European partners something of a crisis of confidence.

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