Having crushed the recent reform movement, Iran's mullahs are now offering their people a different deal: limited economic liberalization in exchange for political acquiescence. This authoritarian bargain has worked well in China and elsewhere. But its success in Iran-a divided land mired in corruption-remains far from certain.
Afshin Molavi has covered Iran for news outlets including The Washington Post and Reuters and is the author of Persian Pilgrimages: Journeys Across Iran. He is a Fellow at the New America Foundation.
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini once famously dismissed an aide worried about inflation by telling him that "this revolution was not about the price of watermelons." Today, Khomeini's successors are finding the high price of watermelons-not to mention of meat, housing, and cars-much harder to ignore. The untold story of postrevolutionary Iran is one of economic decline: the steady, 25-year deterioration of a nation that once boasted a per capita income equivalent to Spain's, pumped six million barrels of oil a day, and nurtured a vibrant middle class. Today, Iran's real per capita income is a third of what it was before the revolution; oil production is two-thirds of the 1979 level, and the middle class is being squeezed by chronically high inflation, widespread UN-and underemployment, and debilitating wage stagnation.
In May 2005, President Mohammad Khatami, who thundered into office in 1997 on a platform of political and social liberalization, will leave his job chastened and largely defeated by his conservative foes. Not only did he fail to achieve political change, he also proved unable to heal the sick economy he inherited or to ward off a looming employment crisis. With its extremely young population-two-thirds of which is under the age of 30-Iran needs to create more than 800,000 jobs a year. So far, the government has failed even to come close to that target. As a result, Iran's young people have grown deeply frustrated and hungry for political change and economic relief-even as they remain unsure of how to achieve them.
The newly resurgent conservatives think they have the answer. Having beaten back the reformers' challenge through bureaucratic infighting, organized violence, the jailing of leading reformers, and election-rigging, the conservatives now want to embark on a program dubbed the "China model" by Iran's media. The idea-which is neither new nor profound nor uniquely Chinese-is to offer economic growth, jobs, and limited social freedom in exchange for continued control of the political sphere. The conservatives are betting that Iran's citizens will be satisfied with consumerism and thus give up their demands for pluralism.
This is a premium article
You must be a Foreign Affairs subscriber to continue reading. If you are already a print subscriber, click here to activate your online access.
Log In
Buy PDF
Buy a premium PDF reprint of this article.Related
From the very beginning of the Iranian Revolution, the West--and particularly the United States--seems to have been struck by a peculiar sort of political blindness. The first signs of revolt passed unnoticed. The explosions of rage in the spring of 1978, first in Tabriz and then in Qum, were attributed to "obscurantist mullahs" hostile to the Shah's agrarian reform. The immense demonstrations by millions of Iranians, as well as the strikes in the administrations, factories, schools, universities and oil fields which paralyzed the state and in the last analysis caused the monarch's inglorious departure, were attributed to the "fanaticism" of the Iranian people. How could it have been otherwise, it was asked at the time, since the population was following a reactionary old cleric in revolt against a man who had devoted his entire life to modernizing his country?
THE winds of economic nationalism are blowing strong in Latin America. This is evident in the nationalist and progressive régime in Peru, the rise and fall of the leftist government in Bolivia, the changes of policy in conservative countries like Colombia and Argentina and the spectacular election of a socialist government in Chile. There are also the numerous acts of nationalization in various countries, most of which have gone largely unnoticed, while others like the nationalization of petroleum in Peru and Bolivia, natural gas in Venezuela, aluminum in Guyana and copper in Chile have reached the headlines. Furthermore, there are restrictive foreign investment statutes unanimously endorsed by the Andean Pact nations, the limitations of various kinds imposed on foreign subsidiaries even in countries, like Mexico, otherwise favorable to foreign investment, the unaccustomed incisiveness of the Latin American protest against President Nixon's New Economic Policy voiced in the meetings of the Special Co-ordination Commission of Latin America, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the Organization of American States and the World Bank- International Monetary Fund Annual Conference, as well as the formal withdrawal of Argentina from the Inter-American Committee of the Alliance for Progress.
The economist Hernando de Soto argues in his new book that property rights are an essential ingredient for economic development. But this single-bullet theory would do better by noting the complex cultural factors that also affect growth.
