Can Pakistan Work? A Country in Search of Itself

The result has been ideological confusion, civilian helplessness, and an environment eminently hospitable to putsches. Indeed, no elected government has completed its term in Pakistan's 57-year history. Pakistani generals express contempt for the civilian order and steadfastly hold that "what is good for the army is good for Pakistan," and Pakistani society is thoroughly militarized. Bumper stickers read, "The Finest Men Join the Pakistan Army"; tanks parade on the streets of Islamabad while jet aircraft screech overhead; discarded naval guns, artillery pieces, and fighter aircraft adorn public plazas. It is even a criminal offense to "criticize the armed forces of Pakistan or to bring them into disaffection."

The military is only one (albeit the most important) component of the wider "establishment" that runs Pakistan. Cohen calls this establishment a "moderate oligarchy" and defines it as "an informal political system that [ties] together the senior ranks of the military, the civil service, key members of the judiciary, and other elites." Membership in this oligarchy, Cohen contends, requires adherence to a common set of beliefs: that India must be countered at every turn; that nuclear weapons have endowed Pakistan with security and status; that the fight for Kashmir is unfinished business from the time of partition; that large-scale social reforms such as land redistribution are unacceptable; that the uneducated and illiterate masses deserve only contempt; that vociferous Muslim nationalism is desirable but true Islamism is not; and that Washington is to be despised but fully taken advantage of. Underlying these "core principles," one might add, is a willingness to serve power at any cost.

BLOWBACK

Pakistan was put under U.S. sanctions after its nuclear tests in May 1998 and is now frequently referred to as a nuclear proliferator motivated by radical Islamist visions. But, as Cohen points out, Pakistan's nuclear dreams probably began 40 years ago when-under the aegis of the Central Treaty Organization-the U.S. Army initiated large-scale training of Iranian, Turkish, and Pakistani officers in armor, artillery, and other technical services. Hundreds of Pakistani officers attended U.S. schools between 1955 and 1958. "There was an important American contribution in the form of periodic visits by American nuclear experts to the Staff College in Quetta," says Cohen. During a visit to the Staff College, he noted that the school's official history refers to "a 1957 visit by a U.S. nuclear-warfare team that 'proved most useful and resulted in modification and revision of the old syllabus' to bring it into line with the 'fresh data' given by the team." In Cohen's opinion, "present-day Pakistani nuclear planning and doctrine is descended directly from this early exposure to Western nuclear strategizing; it very much resembles American thinking of the mid-1950s with its acceptance of first-use and the tactical use of nuclear weapons against onrushing conventional forces."

Cohen brings this new, and quite surprising, insight to U.S.-Pakistan nuclear history, but one might have expected a more detailed examination of this critical area, rather than a few quick comments. It is, in fact, a subject worthy of another book from him.

Pakistan's nuclear program began in earnest after India tested a "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974. Washington initially succeeded in thwarting Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, persuading France not to sell Pakistan a reprocessing plant. But Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist employed by a European consortium that enriched uranium for nuclear power, forged ahead, surreptitiously acquiring classified information and materials and passing them to Bhutto's government. Using reverse engineering, Pakistan successfully built and began operating a uranium enrichment facility. By the time Bhutto was overthrown and hanged by his successor, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the nuclear program was in full swing.

The U.S. response has been a series of flips and flops, largely determined by immediate political needs rather than long-term strategic thinking. President Jimmy Carter imposed sanctions on Islamabad but waived them following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. A series of presidential waivers allowed U.S. economic and military assistance to continue flowing through 1990, as a reward for Pakistan's anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan. This was despite the fact that Pakistan disclosed in 1984 that it could enrich uranium for nuclear weapons and in 1987 that it could assemble a nuclear device. Even as the president of the United States solemnly informed Congress that Pakistan was not seeking to make nuclear weapons, anyone in Islamabad or Rawalpindi could hail a taxicab and ask to be taken to what was (and is) known as the "bomb factory." Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington toughened its stance on Pakistan's nuclear program and, after the 1998 nuclear tests (which were in response to similar moves by India), imposed harsh new sanctions. But soon after September 11, 2001-when Islamabad regained the strategic significance it had lost at the end of the Cold War-Washington dropped all nuclear-related sanctions, in part as a reward for Musharraf's decision to join the U.S.-led coalition against the Taliban.